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Abstrac t 
 
 
The security threat from malicious insiders affects all organizations.   Mitigating 
this problem is quite difficult due to the fact that (1) there is no definitive profile for 
malicious insiders, (2) organizations have placed trust in these individuals, and (3) 
ins ide rs have a vast knowledge of their organization’s personnel, security policies, and 
information systems.    
The purpose of this research is to analyze to what extent the United States Air 
Force (USAF) security policies address the insider threat problem.  The policies are 
reviewed in terms of how well they align with best practices published by the Carnegie 
Mellon University Computer Emergency Readiness Team and additional factors this 
research deems important, including motivations, organizational priorities, and social 
networks. 
Based on the findings of the policy review, this research offers actionable 
recommendations that the USAF could implement in order to better prevent, detect, and 
respond to malicious insider attacks.  The most important course of action is to better 
utilize its workforce.  All personnel should be trained on observable behaviors that can be 
precursors to malicious activity.  Additionally, supervisors need to be empowered as the 
first line of defense, monitoring for stress, unmet expectations, and disgruntlement.  In 
addition, this research proposes three new best practices regarding (1) screening for prior 
concerning behaviors, predispositions, and technical incidents, (2) issuing sanctions for 
inappropriate technical acts, and (3) requiring supervisors to take a proactive role. 
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MITIGATING INSIDER SABOTAGE AND ESPIONAGE: 
A REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE’S CURRENT POSTURE  
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Overview 
The security threat from malicious insiders is a substantial problem in all 
organizations today.  In this research an insider is defined as someone who is or has been 
with the organization and can be from any of the following categories: employees, 
service providers, consultants, and contractors (CSO, 2007).  Activities and methods  used 
by insiders can vary from espionage to sabotaging an organization’s network.   According 
to CSO magazine’s “2007 E-Crime Watch Survey,” 26% of the security events occurring 
in that year were known or believed to be caused by insiders, compared with 58% being 
attributed to outsiders.  Of the 671 security executives and law enforcement officials 
surveyed, 29% of them felt the greatest threat to cyber security came from insiders, 
compared to 41% who believed outsiders presented the greater risk (CSO, 2007).  When 
comparing the cost of attacks, 34% of the respondents cited insider attacks as being the 
most damaging, compared to 37% choosing attacks from outsiders (CSO, 2007). 
One of the reasons why the insider threat problem is so difficult to combat, as 
well as why these attacks can be so damaging, is because insiders are trusted by and have 
knowledge of the organization.  Insiders have a huge advantage compared to outsiders by 
already knowing the organization’s personnel, security policies, and information systems 
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(Mills et al., 2009).  In addition, the organization has consciously decided to put trust in 
its employees and may even have subjected them to background checks and interviews.   
In the case of former insiders, the trust may have been rescinded but these 
individuals retain their knowledge of the organization’s functions, people, and processes. 
Non-disclosure agreements are often used to de ter individuals from using that knowledge, 
but the risk exists nonetheless.  
The vast majority of the respondents of the “2007 E-Crime Watch Survey” were 
more concerned about attacks than they were the previous year, and only 11% saw a 
decrease in the number of and financial loss from targeted attacks.  Given these figures it 
is surprising that the results showed that the average spending o n information technology 
and corporate security has decreased (CSO, 2007).  Additionally, implementing 
appropriate security measures to prevent insider attacks does not appear to be a priority.  
The creation and use of background checks, account and password management policies, 
monitoring and auditing tools, and training and awareness programs all fell significantly 
in 2007 (CSO, 2007).   Less than half of the respondents claimed to use the following 
essential security measures: security and account audits, employee monitoring, training 
and awareness programs, periodic risk assessments, reporting of misuse, and technically 
enforced separation of duty policies (CSO, 2007).  In contrast, measures to prevent 
outside attacks, such as the use of firewalls, SPAM filtering, and anti-virus tools, were 
almost universally used (CSO, 2007).    
It is important to note that even if an organization is not detecting malicious 
activity, it may still be occurring.  This organization may not have sufficient controls in 
place as a result of the organization not having experienced an attack.  Some 
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organizations fall into a “trust trap” in which they cut back on security measures since 
they are not detecting any malicious activity and feel they can trust their employees 
(Moore et al., 2008).  However, an attack can come at any time, with the attackers and 
methods of attack changing constantly.  It can be difficult to know what mechanisms are 
successfully preventing insider attacks, but companies may find out the hard way if they 
cut back on security controls.  With organizations primarily focusing their attention on 
attacks coming from the outside, the current security environment is very attractive to 
those insiders wishing to do harm.   
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The purpose of this research is to analyze to what extent the United States Air 
Force (USAF) security policies address the insider threat problem.  The policies are first 
examined using a set of best practices published by the Carnegie Mellon University 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CMU CERT) technical staff (Cappelli et al., 
2006; Band et al., 2006).  Specifically, the research analyzes if and how well the USAF 
security policies, as well as a few of the cornerstone Department of Defense (DoD) 
policies, implement these best practices.    
Furthermore the policies are reviewed in terms of how well they addressed the 
variables in this research’s “Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage.”  This 
mod el is based on the “Abstracted Common Model” developed by the CMU CERT 
technical staff and additionally included the factors of social networks, insider 
motivations, and organizational priorities.  The Abstracted Common Model was selected 
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as it was deemed most relevant and understandable for the audience of USAF leade rs and 
supervisors.   
Based on the findings of the policy review, this research offers actionable 
recommendations that the USAF could implement in order to better prevent, detect, and 
respond to malicious insider attacks.  In addition, this research proposes three new best 
practices that can be used by any organization to mitigate this threat to security. 
 
1.3 Scope 
In the article “Analysis of End User Security Behaviors,” Stanton et al.  (2005) 
describe security incidents in terms of the intention (malicious, neutral, or beneficial) and 
expertise (high o r low).  While incidents of a neutral or beneficial nature may actually do  
harm to an organization, such as “dangerous tinkering” and “naïve mistakes” (Stanton et 
al., 2005), this research focuses on incidents of a malicious nature.  Though malicious 
acts requiring high expertise, termed “intentional destruction,” are often the most 
dangerous, those requiring low expertise (“detrimental misuse”) are included as well 
(Stanton et al.,  2005).  These acts of detrimental misuse may be precursory actions and 
should not be ignored. 
In risk assessment, a threat-source is an entity that exploits a vulnerability (Elky, 
2006).  While threats can come from many different sources, to include weather or an 
electrical disruption, this research is only concerned with situations where malicious 
insiders (i.e., people) are the threat-sources. 
This research focuses on two categories of insider threat, sabotage and espionage, 
which are deemed most relevant to the USAF.  Sabotage is the destruction of company 
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resources, such as deploying a logic bomb, while espionage entails the stealing and 
selling of company information.   
The intended audience of this research includes USAF leaders, supervisors, and 
network professionals, especially those with the authority to affect and implement 
organizational policies, controls, and climate.  The research is purposefully written to 
make the subject matter understandable to those without a technical background in 
information technology or any of the modeling types.  The problem of insider threat is 
one which is mitigated only through a group endeavor, from high- level organizational 
leaders to the front- line supervisors; in fact, the immediate supervisor is perhaps the 
strongest part of the overall defense against insider threats. 
 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
This chapter described the significant problem that malicious insider attacks pose 
on today’s organizations and briefly explained the objectives of this research.  Chapter II 
presents the current information published on ins ider threat, to include the variables that 
come into play and historical case studies.  Existing insider threat models are discussed, 
as well as background information regarding logical data and systems dynamics 
modeling.  Chapter III explains this research’s process for modeling the problem, 
including the initial development of a logical da ta mod el and a system dynamics model.  
This chapter also discusses the selection of the Abstracted Common Model as the basis of 
this research’s Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage, which is used in the 
USAF policy review.  An explanation is also given of the incorporation of motivations, 
organizational priorities, and social networks into this research’s final model.  Chapter IV 
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explains the methodology for the review of the DoD and USAF policies in terms of 
insider threat mitigation measures, to include the best practices published by the CMU 
CERT technical staff.  The results of the policy review are presented, as well as 
recommendations aimed to assist the USAF in battling the insider problem.  In addition, 
this research proposes three new best practices that can be implemented by any 
organization.  Finally, Chapter V provides a summary of the research along with a 
discussion of its conclusions and impact.  Recommendations for future research are also 
provided.  
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II. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Overview  
There is no definitive profile for a malicious insider or for an organization that 
will suffer an insider attack. From analyzing case studies of actual attacks, researchers 
have found themes and commonalities.  This chapter discusses the current information 
published on insider threat, in particular the various factors and their incorporation into 
existing models.  Two historical case studies are presented in detail to further 
demonstrate how these factors come into play.  This chapter also provides background 
information on logical data modeling and system dynamics modeling as both are used in 
the models developed in this research.   
 
2.2 Factors in the Insider Threat Problem 
In examining the insider threat problem, current research articles and models 
focus on one or more of the following factors: insider precursors, expectations, and 
motivations; organizational controls, priorities, and trust; social networks; and event 
triggers.  This next section defines and takes a closer look at each of these. 
2.2.1 Precursors of the Malicious Party  
From analyzing case studies of famous insider attacks, researchers have found 
that the orchestrators shared psychological, professional, legal, and economic 
characteristics and behaviors, as well as committed similar technical precursory incidents 
leading up to the actual attacks.   
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Historically, malicious insiders have been described as intelligent, dishonest, 
egotistical, passionate, and instable (Tuglular, 2000).  In addition, malicious insiders 
often lack strength of character and self-control and are prone to taking risks.  They 
frequently have poor social skills (Tuglular, 2000) and are resistant to change (Cappelli et 
al., 2007).  Malicious insiders may also have participated in unusual sexual behavior and 
had addictions to alcohol, drugs, or gambling (Under Secretary for Management, 2006).    
Before launching attacks, ins iders have often exhibited certain behaviors, such as making 
alarming s tatements and acting out of character (Puleo, 2006).  
In terms of the malicious parties’ professional life, they often exhibited poor, 
declining, or inconsistent job performance; examples include failing to meet deadlines, 
inability to handle an appropriate workload, and absenteeism.   In add ition, they may 
have been dissatisfied with the ir job and believed they had poor job security (Puleo, 
2006).  Although not all insider attacks require a lot of skill, the case studies show that 
the malicious parties often possessed strong professional skills, such as those in the realm 
of information technology.  In add ition, they usua lly had acquired a substantial amount of 
professional knowledge regarding their organization’s structure, information systems, and 
security policies and controls (Tuglular, 2000).   
A similar problem to trying to identify traits and behaviors of malicious insiders is 
that of trying to decide who in an organization can be trusted with classified information.  
Again, there is no exclus ive set of factors, but the federal government has created the 
“Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified 
Information” (Under Secretary for Management, 2006).  One of the areas of foc us for  
these guidelines is whether individuals have a criminal record.  If they do, they may be 
9 
 
predisposed to illegal or immoral activity.  Another area examines the individuals’ 
financial situation, to include economic stability and security, as well as the presence of 
any unusual activity.  If employees are having, or have had, legal or financial problems, 
they may be susceptible to blackmail or solicitations to commit espionage (Under 
Secretary for Management, 2006).   
Technical precursors are common in insider threat cases.  In terms of sabotage 
attacks, insiders usually preferred to “test the waters” before launching the full-blown 
attack.  In add ition, certain activities may have needed to take place in order for the attack 
to be successful and possibly even more devastating, such as the destruction of recovery 
materials.  In espionage attacks, insiders have often conducted unusual or unauthorized 
behavior on the network in order to obtain the information they needed.  Examples of 
precursory incidents include the following: accessing unauthorized websites, installing 
unauthorized software, cracking passwords, escalating one’s privileges, creating covert 
channels, sending coded messages (Mills et al., 2009), social engineering, orchestrating a 
denial of service attack, purposefully not completing their job-related duties, 
masquerading, unauthorized reading or modifying of resources (Phyo and Furnell, 2004), 
stealing or hiding data, spamming, downgrading classifications, modifying activity logs, 
and redirecting output (Brackney and Anderson, 2004). 
Figure 1 shows a taxonomy of observable precursors that was developed at a 
Advanced Research and Development Activity (ARDA) workshop. This single figure 
combines many of the factors discussed earlier, to include technical precursors, economic 
situation, and addictions.  This taxonomy reiterates the broad range of behaviors that can 
possibly come into play in the complex insider threat problem. 
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Figure 1. Cyber Event/Observable Taxonomy (Mills et al., 2009) 
 
2.2.2 Insider’s Expectations 
The recognition, rewards, freedoms, and responsibilities that insiders expect from 
the ir management can also play a role in whether they commit malicious acts.  In all 
manager-employee relationships, there are psychological contracts, or unwritten 
agreements, between the two parties (Robbins and Judge, 2008).  If managers do not 
fulfill employees’ expectations, the employees may become disgruntled (Moore et al.,  
2008).  As mentioned earlier, a common trait of malicious insiders is egotism.  Many feel 
they deserve frequent recognition, in terms of raises, promotions, and additional authority 
or responsibility.  If they feel they are underappreciated, they may decide to commit 
espionage to earn more money or to commit sabotage as retaliation against the company.  
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2.2.3 Event Triggers 
Certain events can be factors in the insider threat problem.  Most commonly, 
events can increase or decrease an insiders’ motivation to launch an attack.  Negative 
events may worsen the mental, economic, or professional state of insiders, and they may 
become more enticed to seek retaliation or profit.  O n the other hand, positive events may 
lessen their motivation as they may not want to risk their improved status.  An event may 
be at the individual level, such as a marriage, divorce, birth of child, death in family, or 
health issue (Puleo, 2006).  A negative event (from the insider’s perspective), such as an 
assignment to a more demanding supervisor, can lead to a decrease in expectation 
fulfillment and in turn increased disgruntlement (Moore et al., 2008).  Events may also be 
at the organizational level, to include restructuring, mergers, personnel cuts, and 
relocation.   
Recent articles have shown that nationwide events, such as the current economic 
situation, can also trigger malicious insider activity.  In uncertain times employees can 
become nervous about layoffs or disgruntled over not receiving a bonus or promotion.  In 
2008 a disgruntled employee of the city of San Francisco intentionally altered 
administrative passwords, locking out the rest of the company from critical network 
resources for days (Vijayan, 2008).  This year it was discovered that a former Fannie Mae 
contractor had planted malicious software on the company’s network after being 
terminated (McMillan, 2009). 
2.2.4 Social Networks 
The relationships that insiders have within an organization can play into the 
insider threat problem in two different and opposing ways.  Per the Social Bond Theory, 
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insiders who have strong relationships with their managers or co-workers are less likely 
to commit a malicious act.  If insiders feel attached to their co-workers, they do not want 
to lose these friendships either by their co-workers’ disapproving of their actions or the 
company firing them (Theoharidou et al., 2005).  In a study looking for possible 
predictors of withdrawal behaviors, a strong negative correlation was found between co-
worker satisfaction and unexcused absenteeism.  The author theorized that this was due to 
the employees not wanting to risk the friendships they had made with co-workers by 
exhibiting deviant behavior (Blau, 1985).  Additionally, insiders may feel committed to 
these co-workers and not want to bring harm to them professionally by executing an 
attack on the organization’s assets (Theoharidou et al., 2005).  Historical attacks have 
resulted in loss of customers and contracts, destruction of an organization’s critical 
information and assets, decrease in worker productivity, and damages equaling millions 
of dollars (Melara et al., 2003).   
Workplace relationships could also increase insiders’ motivation to commit a 
malicious act.  Per the Social Learning Theory (Theoharidou et al., 2005), employees 
who assoc iate with co-workers who are breaking the security policies may be more 
inclined to commit wrongful acts, whether it is in conjunction with these role models or 
by themselves (Theoharidou et al., 2005).  The insiders may rationalize that the deviant 
behavior is acceptable, especially if the co-workers are receiving benefits from it or, at 
the very least, not getting caught. 
2.2.5 Insider Motivations 
As mentioned in the first chapter this research focuses on those insiders with 
malicious intentions.  While many factors, such as psychological traits, relationships, and 
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event triggers, can increase or decrease their motivation to attack, according to Casey 
(2004) the source of the motivation is one or more of the following:    
• Power reassurance (compensatory): mildly aggressive acts committed to see if 
the attacker has the ability to accomplish them, boosts self-confidence (Mills et 
al., 2009)  
• Power assertive (entitlement): moderately to highly aggressive acts used to boost 
self-worth at the expense of the victims.  Attackers want to show the victims they 
are more skilled than and have author ity over the victims (Casey, 2004). 
• Anger retaliatory: highly aggressive acts, to include sabotage, used to gain 
revenge; one of the two most common motives (Mills et al., 2009)  
• Anger excitation (sadistic): highly aggressive, personal act used to gain pleasure 
(Mills et al., 2009) 
• Opportunistic: mildly aggressive acts used to achieve satisfaction, often viewed as 
having a small chance of being de tected (Mills et al., 2009).  This motivation type 
aligns with the General Deterrence Theory which states that people base their 
decisions on maximizing benefit while minimizing cost (Theoharidou et al.,  
2005).  
• Profit oriented: varying in aggressiveness, often coupled with greed (Shaw et al.,  
1998) and power reassurance, includes espionage; other most common motive 
(Mills et al., 2009) 
2.2.6 Organizational Controls 
Organizational controls are put into place to help protect an organization from 
attacks, from both insiders and outsiders.  Ideally these controls deter or prevent an 
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attack, but at the very least detect if one has occurred.  Organizational controls can be 
grouped into one of the following three categories: technical, formal, and informal 
(Melara et al., 2003).  Ideally, an organization implements measures from all three 
groups. 
• Technical: includes technical monitoring (to include network traffic, e-mail 
traffic, and file access), auditing and disabling access paths (Cappe lli et al., 2007), 
recovery software, antivirus software, backups (Melara et al., 2003), identification 
and authentication procedures, cryptography, discretionary access control, 
(Stoneburner et al., 2002) 
• Formal: includes employee intervention, sanctions (such as demotion, 
termination, and decrease in author ity or pr ivi lege levels), termination threshold 
and time policies (Cappe lli et al., 2007), segregation of security duties, existence 
of a separate security department, risk evaluations, policies regarding authority 
and pr ivi lege levels (Melara et al., 2003) 
• Informal: culture, values, education and training (Melara et al., 2003), warnings 
about repercussions (Rich et al., 2005) 
It is important to note that controls, such as sanctions, may have the oppos ite 
effect of what is intended.  If disgruntled employees are repr imanded for unauthorized 
activity, they may become even more disgruntled and increasingly likely to commit an 
attack.  In such a case, it may be wise to supplement the issuing of sanctions with 
employee intervention (Cappelli et al., 2007). 
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2.2.7 Organizational Priorities 
The priorities of an organization help to form its attitude regarding security.  An 
organization that highly values profits may not find it financially advantageous to invest a 
lot of time and money into security controls.  On the other hand, a company who highly 
values its reputation and feels it cannot risk a high-profile security incident may spend 
more money on security measures (Rich, et al., 2005).  Furthermore, if an organization 
views a certain system as especially vital, it is usually willing to invest more into controls 
to protect that system (Mills et al., 2009).  In most cases, insiders are privy to the 
company’s stance on security and know whether or not it wise to attempt an attack.  
2.2.8 Organizational Trust 
As mentioned earlier, one of the most difficult aspects of the insider threat 
problem is that the insider is trusted by the organization.  Trust is an element of any 
relationship, including those between employees and their managers.  Most research 
breaks down trust into components; this research uses those outlined in the research by 
Mayer et al. (1995).  Put into the context of a work relationship, they are as follows:  
• Ability: one’s skill set and competency in the domain of the task a t hand 
• Benevolence: one’s desire to execute the task well for his manager and the 
organization 
• Integrity: one’s set of morals or values and how they align with the manager’s 
Initially managers are basing the ir trust in a new employee on calculative trust, 
which includes factors such as the employee’s reputation, education, certifications, and 
resume (Rousseau et al., 1998).  At all times, institutional-based trust plays a role; this 
type of trust includes the organization’s controls and mechanisms.  For example, initially 
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managers trust the new employee since they be lieve the company’s interviewing and 
clearance processes are sound.  Managers have confidence that the company selected a 
qualified person, one who is capable to do the job, has the best interest of the company in 
mind, and is moral.  Throughout the relationship, most managers continue to use 
clearance renewals, as well as company policies, procedures, and controls, to assist in 
reevaluating the employee’s trustworthiness (McKnight et al., 1998).  The managers also 
base their trust on their own experiences with and judgments of the employee, known as 
relational trust (Rousseau et al., 1998).  The type of bus iness an organization conducts 
most likely affects how initially trusting it is of its employees.  Again, this is usually 
discernable by the ins iders, a s they see how freely author ity and p rivileges are given out.   
Trust can be a tricky element within an organization, especially in terms of 
security.  If an organization is very trusting of its employees, it may not invest as much 
into security controls.  The lack of controls, such as employee on- line monitoring, could 
reduce the probability of preventing or detecting malicious insider activities.  With little 
or no reported incidents, the company may cut back even more on security measures.  
Sadly, while incidents may not be detected or reported, they could be occurring just the 
same; companies need to be mindful of this “trust trap” (Moore et al., 2008).                         
2.2.9 Risk Management  
The insider threat problem is inherently built on the concept of risk management.  
An organization must balance the costs and benefits that are inherent with cyber security.  
The most obvious cost is money for the information security personnel and resources.  In 
an environment in which every employee and network activity could be completely 
monitored and analyzed, it might be possible to prevent all attacks.  Of course, no 
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organization has the time, money, or personnel to create and maintain such an 
environment.  Often companies worry most about undetected threats, also called false 
negatives, but there is a danger and cost to false positives, or false alarms, as well 
(Martinez-Moyano et al.,  2008).  They can result in employees be ing sanctioned for non-
malicious acts or resources being wastefully used to investigate benign events.   
In any discussion of risk management there are the following basic elements: 
• Threat-source: entity which intentionally or accidentally triggers a 
vulnerability.  As stated earlier, this research is only concerned with malicious 
insiders as the source of threats (Elky, 2006). 
• Threat: potential of threat-source to trigger or exploit vulnerability.  Examples 
of threats include information disclosure, alteration of software, inappropriate 
bandwidth usage, denial of service, alteration of data, configuration error, and 
telecommunication interruption or malfunction (Elky, 2006). 
• Vulnerability: flaw or weakness in a system within the organization that can 
be triggered or exploited.  This flaw could be in the design or implementation 
of the system, or in the security procedures and controls meant to protect it.  
Examples of vulnerabilities include unpatched systems, weak firewall settings, 
and policies that do not require the timely termination of employees’ physical 
access to company facilities (Stoneburner et al., 2002). 
• Likelihood : probability that a threat will be successfully exercised against a 
vulnerability.  Often this is measured qualitatively as low, moderate, or high 
(Elky, 2006). 
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• Impact: combination of losses in terms of confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, as well as effects on mission capability, assets, and human life.  
This often measured qualitatively as low, moderate, or high (Elky, 2006). 
• Risk : determined by analyzing the predicted likelihood and impact of the 
threat to the vulnerability.  Again, this is often measured qualitatively as low, 
medium, high, or critical (Figure 2). 
 The risk management process assists organizations in deciding which threat-
vulnerability pa irs to address first.  Obviously those of high or critical risk are the ones on 
which managers should focus.  To reduce the risk to a system, an organization must first 
                   
Figure 2. Example Risk Level Matrix (Mills et al., 2009) 
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become more aware of its current state, to include its information resources; those 
resources’ vulnerabilities; the motivations, skills, knowledge, and resources of its 
employees; and the controls it has in place to attempt to prevent attacks.  It can estimate 
the likelihood of different threat-vulnerability combinations and determine the resulting 
impact (Stoneburner et al., 2002).  An organization is then prepared to work towards 
lessening the likelihood, impact, or both.  Additional or improved organizational controls 
can help to decrease vulnerabilities as well as the impact, such as maintaining back-up or 
redundant systems.   
 
2.3 Case Studies 
To illustrate how these many individual and organizational factors play into the 
insider threat problem, two of the most famous attacks, committed by Robert Hanssen 
and Timothy Lloyd, are presented below.   
Robert Hanssen was an FBI agent who possessed a Top Secret/Sensitive 
Compartmented Information clearance and committed espionage for over 15 years.  
During this time, he sold thousands of pages of classified documents to agents of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and later Russia, to include information on 
the United States’ nuclear defense strategy (PERSEREC, 2004) and counterintelligence 
tactics (Herbig and Wiskoff, 2002).  Hanssen also shared information about the existence 
of a tunnel underneath the Russian embassy which the U.S. used to spy on them (Herbig 
and Wiskoff, 2002).  He also identified three Russian spies who were working for the 
FBI, two of whom were later executed (PERSEREC, 2004).  Hanssen committed this 
espionage by breaking into classified computer files which he had no need to access for 
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his legitimate FBI responsibilities.  He also used his knowledge of information systems to 
access FBI case files in order to monitor any possible investigations the FBI was 
conducting on him (PERSEREC, 2004).  In addition to the loss in human lives, 
Hanssen’s actions resulted in significant damage to the national security of the United 
States. 
During his time with the FBI, Robert Hanssen could be described as intelligent, 
dishonest, and egotistical, as well as a risk-taker.  A former co-worker said that despite 
his intellect, he did not possess strong social skills and was an introvert (Cooper and 
Garvey, 2001).  Given the number of years he worked in the FBI, he had ample time to 
learn its inner workings.  He was also skilled in the realm of information technology and 
computer security.  Through his various jobs  within the FBI, Hanssen gained access to 
many FBI case and counterintelligence databases, to include ones owned by the NSA, 
CIA, and the State Department (Herbig and Wiskoff, 2002).   
Robert Hanssen lived well above his means as a federal employee.  He paid for 
the down payment and remodeling on his Washington D.C. home in cash, and he sent his 
six children to expensive private schools (Havill, 2001b).  Despite the supplementary 
income from his espionage, Hanssen managed to accumulate a significant amount of 
debt, totaling more than $275,000 at one point in time (PERSEREC, 2004).  Hanssen also 
had an extramarital affair with a stripper, on whom he allegedly spent a sizeable portion 
of the money he made from his work with the Russians (PERSEREC, 2004).  Robert 
Hanssen was clearly motivated by profit and greed.  It has also been speculated that he 
was disgruntled with the FBI, perhaps enticing him to retaliate against the organization 
(PERSEREC, 2004).  Given his egotistical nature, he mos t likely enjoyed the thrill of 
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being able to commit his illegal acts, especially while working for such a prestigious 
organization as the FBI. 
 Timothy Lloyd worked for the Omega Engineering Corpor ation for 11 years, 
making his way up to the position of system administrator.  He was subsequently 
demoted and fired from the company, but before he left, he loaded a software “time 
bomb” onto the network that was programmed to deploy once he was gone (Melara et al., 
2003).  Lloyd worsened the effects by stealing backup tapes and changing a company 
policy to centralize the storage of company programs, replacing the former method of 
housing them on numerous works tations.  The destruction from the bomb cost the 
company more than $10 million in damages to hardware and software, decreased 
productivity, and lost customer revenue (Melara et al., 2003). 
Like  Hanssen, Lloyd was intelligent, unscrupulous, and egotistical, as well as 
instable towards the end of his time with Omega.  Lloyd’s expectations were rarely met, 
and he seldom felt he received the recognition he deserved.  He was extremely unhappy 
when Omega Engineering Corporation expanded and his authority became diluted.  After 
being demoted, Lloyd began to physically and verbally abuse his co-workers and to 
purposefully slow down projects (Melara et al., 2003).   
Lloyd had extens ive knowledge of the company’s po licies, structure, and 
information systems.  He developed much of the network on which Omega depended and 
was well aware of its weaknesses and vulnerabilities.  As system administrator, he 
created many of the company’s security policies (Melara et al., 2003).  Before launching 
the software “time bomb”, he caused a number of smaller network incidents aimed at 
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decreasing performance and causing downtime on the network.  He was most likely 
motivated by his need for revenge and increased self-worth. 
 
2.4 Insider Threat Models 
To better understand the variables that can come into play in the insider threat 
prob lem and how they affect each other, p revious insider threat research has modeled this 
problem.  This section presents eight models published in previous insider threat 
research.  These models focus on one or more of the factors discussed earlier in the 
chapter.  This section also gives a br ief description of logical data and system dynamics 
modeling, to include the symbols used and example models.  These two types of 
modeling were used in this and previous research.   
2.4.1 Voltaire 
Laird and Rickard (2005) proposed a system called Voltaire that could be used to 
help mitigate insider threat issues by detecting unusual computer use behavior that could 
be technical precursors.  The first step in the system is to develop a model of “normal” 
behavior for each user in a given organization, looking at document access, network 
usage, and semantic content of documents.  Once these profiles are established, the 
insiders are monitored for unusual behavior.  The system also looks for inappropriate 
behaviors that were present in past insider threat cases.  Examples of the dimensions that 
the system analyzes are below: 
• Documents Deleted From Database  
• Documents Modified versus Read Ratio 
• Documents Read versus Written Ratio  
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• Documents Printed  
• Printing Other Users’ Documents 
• Different Printers Used  
• Number of Databases Accessed 
• Specific Databases Accessed  
• Latest Work End Time  
• Earliest Work Start Time 
 
2.4.2 Risk Predictor Model  
Puleo (2006) developed the “Risk Predictor Model” that examines human 
behaviors and outside influences to determine insiders who have a higher potential of 
committing a malicious act.  The model is comprised of the following four components: 
• Influence Matrix: how different influences (such as stress, pay cut, 
relationship with family, and family financial status) affect one another 
• Event Matrix: how events (such as financial loss, change in physical health, 
and recent termination) affect influences 
• Response Vector: how strongly insiders are affected by each influence (For 
example, individuals may have a lot of stress, but solid relationships with their 
families help them to handle it well.) 
• Stimulus Vector: if an event has occurred in an individual’s life  
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 Versions of these matrices and vectors are created to represent a typical 
employee.  These standards can then be used to compare to actual insiders and detect 
those who deviate significantly from the average. 
2.4.3 Multidiscipline Approach to Mitigating the Insider Threat  
The “Multidiscipline Approach to Mitigating the Insider Threat” (MAMIT) model 
(see Figure 3) combines numerous factors discussed earlier.  It examines the motivations 
of the insiders, to include opportunity, as well as observes their behaviors, actions, and 
network usage.  This model also incorporates elements of risk management, to include 
threats and vulnerabilities.  The Centralized Analyst or Agent compiles indicators and 
produces individual and organizational threat levels.  The individuals with threat leve ls 
that are greater than the acceptable organization threat level are tagged as potential  
 
 
 Figure 3. MAMIT (Butts, 2006) 
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malicious parties.  Upon identifying a potential threat-source, possible courses of action 
are to warn management, increase monitoring of the tagged insider, and lock-out the 
insider from network systems.  Some actions could be made automatically and based 
solely on network activity, while others may necessitate the existence of past behaviors or 
job-related incidents and require managerial approval (Butts, 2006). 
2.4.4 Logical Data Modeling 
Before presenting Tuglular’s (2000) structural approach to insider threat, which is 
the inspiration for this research’s first model, “Insider Threat Logical Data Model,” this 
section provides background information on logical da ta modeling.   
2.4.4.1 Background Information on Logical Data Modeling 
Logical data modeling, also called entity-relationship (E-R) diagramming,  
provides a way to study entities of interest, specific attributes of interest, and the 
relationships between entities (Department of Defense, 2007).  For a business 
organization, example entities include personnel, resources, policies, and products.  
Attributes are used to describe the entities in more detail, such as a person’s name, 
position within the company, and security clearance.  Relationships are then determined 
to depict the associations between entities, such as manager/subordinate and peer/peer 
relationships and job functions.  The purpose of logical data modeling is to better 
understand the resources of an organization, to include what information about them is 
important and how they interact with each other.  This type of modeling is often done 
when designing databases to ensure all the correct information and tables are included 
and developed.  Figure 4 depicts a very simple logical data model for a real estate  
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Figure 4. Logical Data Model Example 
 
company.  The level of detail required depends on the nature of the problem being 
solved.    
Figure 4 shows four different entities: EMPLOYEE, SALES OFFICE, 
PROPERTY, and OWNER.  Each entity is a noun—person, place or thing—and has 
various attributes used to describe that entity. For example, an EMPLOYEE has an 
Employee_ID, as well as a Name, Address, Phone_Number, DOB, and SSN.  Usually,  
there is a primary key that uniquely identifies a specific member of that entity                   
class, such as Employee_ID.  The model also shows the relationships between the 
entities.  Relationships are represented with verb or verb phrase names to show how one 
entity interacts with or depends on another. For example, a SALES OFFICE “Employs” 
an EMPLOYEE.   Various types of relationships exist, but the ones that are of most 
interest here are identifying and non-specific relations hips.  An identifying relationship is 
EMPLOYEE
Employee_ID
Name
Address
Phone_Number
DOB
SSN
OWNER
Owner_ID
Name
Phone_Number
PROPERTY
Property_ID
Address
Listing_Price
SALES OFFICE
Office_ID
Address
Phone_Number
Manages Lists
P
P
Owns
P
Employs
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also referred to as a parent-child relationship. In a parent-child relationship, the child 
entity cannot exist without the parent, and the pa rent’s primary key(s) (PK) migrates to 
the child entity as a foreign key (FK).  A single parent may have multiple children, but a 
child can have only one parent.   
 A non-specific relationship is one in which “an instance of either entity can be 
related to a number of instances of the other entity” (Colombi, 2008).  Relationships can 
also have cardina lity, which identifies how many of each entity there may be.  Figure 5 
presents the symbols for the types of relationships and cardinality used in this research’s 
mod el. 
Identifying Relationship  
 Non-specific Relationship 
Cardinality of zero, one, or more 
Cardinality of one or more                    P 
Cardinality of exactly one                     1        
Figure 5. Logical Data Model Symbols (Colombi, 2008) 
 
2.4.4.2 Structural Approach to Insider Computer Misuse Incidents 
Tuglular’s (2000) structural approach to the insider threat problem focuses on the 
following three main entities, which all have many subcomponents:  
• Incident : target (threat realized, value, and control), subject (reason), method,  
place, time 
• Response: recognition, trace information, evidence, suspect (profiles, 
qualifications, and access authorization) 
28 
 
• Consequences: disruption (confidentiality, integrity, and availability), loss 
(financial, morale, clients, publicity, and productivity), effect, violation 
(policies), result 
 Tuglular viewed these entities as the foundation from which future insider threat 
detection systems could be created.  This approach aims to identify potential malicious 
insiders by continuous and extensive information collection.  By analyzing incidents to a 
greater level of detail, he hoped to better prevent future attacks.   
2.4.5 System Dynamics Modeling 
Before presenting the remaining five insider threat models, this section provides 
background information on system dynamics modeling as it used in all of them.  The 
final model, “Model of the Insider IT Sabotage Problem,” was the basis for this 
research’s second model, entitled “Insider Threat System Dynamics Model.”  
2.4.5.1 Background Information on System Dynamics Modeling 
System dynamics modeling can aid in better understanding a complex problem by 
diagramming its variables and how they affect each other over time (Moore et al.,  2008).  
In the example depicted in Figure 6, the variables include overtime hours required and 
work done.  Furthermore, arrows represent the relationships between variables, and each 
relationship has a source and target.  In Figure 6, overtime hours required is the source of 
two relationship arrows and the target of one.  These relations hips show the influence that 
two variables might have on each other.  Relationships  show either positive or negative 
correlation.  For the example in Figure 6, there is a negative correlation between fatigue 
and quality of work; as fatigue increases, quality of work decreases.  Symbology used to 
represent these relationships varies.  I n Figure 6, a positive correlation is shown us ing a  
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Figure 6. System Dynamics Modeling Example (Ventana Systems, Inc., 2007) 
 
‘+’ sign, and a negative correlation is indicated by a ‘-’ sign.  A positive correlation can 
also be depicted by a solid line or letter ‘S’ (for “same”), while a negative correlation can 
be indicated by a dashed line, or ‘O’(for “opposite”). 
Complex system dynamics models often include feedback loops that are either 
balancing or reinforcing; some references refer to these as negative and positive, 
respectively (Sterman, 2000).  A balancing loop models a situation where the 
relationships between two or more variables lead to a goal state.   Though change is 
occurring, the variables are working to establish and maintain an equilibrium condition.  
A reinforcing loop is essentially the opposite; the relationships between these variables 
are continuously driving the values either upward or downward (Moore et al., 2008).  In 
Figure 6, the red, positive loop is reinforcing as Work to Do is continually increasing.  As 
the amount of work to do increases, employees are required to work more overtime 
hours.  If the overtime causes fatigue, the quality of work will actually decrease.  This 
initiates a vicious cycle because work will have to be reaccomplished, which in turn 
Work to Do
work done
overtime hours required
fatigue
quality of work
+
+
-
+
-
-
BalancingReinforcing
+ -
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could lead to even more overtime hours.  On the other hand, if the employees do not  
experience fatigue and are successfully able to accomplish high quality work during the 
overtime hours, they will have less work to do.  This second scenario is a balancing loop 
and is depicted by the blue, negative loop in Figure 6.  
Sometimes “stock and flow” symbols are used in system dynamics modeling to 
represent the levels and rates of variables in a problem.  A stock represents a level of a 
variable in the problem, and it can have both an inflow and an outflow.  The inflow comes 
from a source and outflow goes into a sink .  Figure 7 illustrates these stock and flow 
components. 
              
Figure 7. Stock and Flow Symbols (Ventana Systems, Inc., 2007) 
 
Figure 8 illustrates a simple example which models rabbit population, taking into 
consideration factors such as birth rate and life expectancy.                                      
 
Figure 8. Stock and Flow Example (Ventana Systems, Inc., 2007) 
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2.4.5.2 Insider Attack on an Information System 
 One method for analyzing the insider threat problem is to model one specific case 
study.  In the “System Dynamic of Insider Attack on an Information System” (see Figure 
9) developed by Melara, et al. (2003), the authors analyzed the case study of Timothy 
Lloyd’s attack at the Omega Engineering Corporation.  Melara, et al. (2003) focused on 
Lloyd’s precursory incidents and aggressive acts, which they felt both stemmed from his 
discontent and disgruntlement with the company.  Since Lloyd’s technical precursors 
were primarily causing downtime on the information systems, downtime was a primary 
variable, analyzed in terms of impact and recovery.  The model also looked at Omega 
Engineering’s commitment to security (or lack thereof), its formal controls, and its 
decision to fire Lloyd.   
 Once created and validated, the model was tested by analyzing how variables 
such as management perception of technical security, technical security reduction, and 
technical security level are affected over time by varying levels of formal controls 
(ranging from “no” to “high”).  In all three cases the implementation of high formal 
controls resulted in positive effects for the organization, to include increased management 
perception of technical security, decreased reduction in security by insider, and increased 
technical security level (Melara et al., 2003).  
2.4.5.3 Insider IT Sabotage Model 
 The CMU CERT technical staff has developed many system dynamics models, 
including the “Insider IT Sabotage Model” (see Figure 10) (Band et al., 2006).  This 
model contains attributes of the insider, to include disgruntlement, predispositions, stress,  
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Figure 9. Model of Insider Attack on an Information System (Melara et al., 2003) 
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and expectation.  It also focuses on both the behavioral and technical indicators that can 
be monitored and audited.  In addition, the model takes into account how an organization 
might  react to such events, through such channels as employee intervention or sanctions.  
The access paths known and unknown to the organization are also very important 
elements. 
 This model also includes balancing and reinforcing loops (described in Figure 
11).  One example of a balancing loop (labeled ‘B3’ in Figures 10 and 11) refers to 
precursory events decreasing because of the issuing of sanctions, which had increased an 
insider’s perceived risk of being caught.  As mentioned previously, issuing sanctions can 
also have an opposite effect.  The disgruntlement sanctioning escalation loop shows the 
spiraling effect of this reinforcing loop (labeled ‘ R5’ in Figures 10 and 11).  An employee 
who receives sanctions may become more stressed and disgruntled, which in turn could 
lead to more precursory events. 
2.4.5.4 Espionage Model  
 The CMU CERT technical staff also developed a system dynamics mod el ent itled   
“Espionage Model" to look at the variables and relationships present in the espionage 
component of the insider threat problem (see Figure 12) (Band, et al., 2006).  This model 
also included many factors related to the insider, to include personal needs, disposition, 
stress, and willingne ss to commit espionage.  Financial needs and greed were very 
prominent factors as well.  On the organizational side, there were variables concerning 
monitoring and auditing, access paths, discovering of espionage, trust, sanctions, security 
procedures and awareness training, and culture of reporting suspicious behavior.  The 
model also included influence from the outside in terms of external forces eliciting spies.   
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This model includes the same feedback loops as the Insider IT Sabotage Model 
(explained in Figure 11). 
2.4.5.5 Abstracted Common Model  
 The CMU CERT technical staff was asked by one of its sponsors, the Defense 
Personnel Security Research Center, to examine commonalities between the sabo tage and 
espionage categories of insider threat.  After creating the Insider IT Sabotage Model and 
Espionage Model discussed above, the CMU CERT technical staff developed the 
Abstracted Common Model (see Figure 13).  By analyzing case studies from both 
subcategories, the staff found the six significant commonalties listed below (Band et al., 
2006): 
1. Malicious insiders had common personal predispositions that led them to 
commit sabotage or espionage, such as mental health disorders, alcoholism, 
personality problems (e.g., anger, sense of entitlement, egotism), poor social 
and decision-making skills, and history of rule conflicts.  These personal 
dispositions resulted in personal needs which in turn led to harmful actions 
against the organization, motivated by disgruntlement, profit, or opportunity. 
2. Often the malicious inside rs were affected by stressful events, such as 
organizational sanctions (to include termination or suspension) and personal 
events.  Furthermore, the insiders’ personal predispositions affected how they 
handled the stressful events.  For example, people prone to feeling angry are 
more likely to become increasingly disgruntled after being issued sanctions.  
This disgruntlement can lead them to commit additional acts, which may only 
lead to further sanctions.   
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3. The malicious insiders exhibited unusual and troublesome behaviors before 
and during the malicious acts.  Examples of these behaviors include being 
tardy or late for work, arguing with co-workers, performing poorly at their 
job, violating security policies and procedures, and voicing grievances with or 
desire to cause harm to the organization.   
4. In both subcategories, the malicious insiders conducted technical precursory 
incidents.  Types of incidents include creating unauthorized access paths, 
accessing documents which they do not need for their job responsibilities, 
excessive printing or copying of documents, and creating and testing logic 
bombs.  Whether the organizations detected these precursory events was 
largely due to the level of monitoring and auditing they conducted.   
5. The organizations either did not detect or ignored rule violations, whether 
technical or behavioral.  On the technical side, often precursory events were 
not detected.  If they were and sanctions were issued, the malicious insiders 
many times just did a better job of concealing future incidents.  On the 
behavioral side, often the rule violations were dismissed or ignored, which 
often emboldened the insiders to continue with such behavior. 
6. A deficiency in access controls, either electronic or physical access to 
resources, helped the malicious insiders to achieve their goal.  In some cases, 
the insiders were given more access than necessary for their job or access was  
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not decreased once they had been demoted.  The organization also may not 
have practiced the security policies of least privilege and separation of duty. 
The Abstracted Common Model also contains the same five balancing and five 
reinforcing loops as the Insider IT Sabotage Model and Espionage Model (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 13. Abstracted Common Model (Band et al., 2006) 
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2.4.5.6 Model of the Insider IT Sabotage Problem 
 From their development of materials for insider threat workshops and talks they 
have given at conferences, the CMU CERT technical staff received feedback regarding 
their system dynamics models.  From that feedback, they developed an abstract Model of 
the Insider IT Sabotage Problem that is more understandable to those who are unfamiliar 
with system dynamics modeling (Moore et al., 2008) (see Figure 14).  They retained the 
core elements, such as personal disposition, expectation, event, disgruntlement, 
monitoring, precursors, sanctions, trust, and access paths, but removed some of the 
smaller, more detailed variables (such as audit qua lity and technical freedom given to 
insider).  As well, they retained five of the balancing (labeled with a ‘B’) and reinforcing 
loops (labeled with an ‘R’), which are as follows: expectation escalation (R1), escalation 
of disgruntlement (R2), unobserved emboldening of insider (R3), trust trap (R4), and 
intended effects of sanctions (B1).    
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter examined the variables that previous research has identified in the 
insider threat problem, to include those attributed to the insider and to the organization.  
To further explain these and see how they can come into play, the attacks performed by 
Robert Hanssen and Timothy Lloyd were described.  Additionally, insider threat models 
from previous research were presented to depict the relationships among these variables.  
In order to better understand these models and those developed for this research, 
background information was included on logical data and system dynamics modeling.   
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Figure 14. Model of the Insider IT Sabotage Problem (Moore et al., 2008) 
 
In the next chapter, the logical data and system dynamics models created for this 
research are presented.  There is also a discussion of why the CMU CERT technical 
staff’s Abstracted Common Model was chosen as the most relevant to the USAF and 
therefore used as the basis for the mode l to be used in the po licy review.  Lastly, the 
chapter will explain the additional variables that were incorporated, resulting in this 
research’s Insider Threat Mode l for Sabotage and Espionage.    
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III. Insider Threat Modeling 
 
 
3.1 Overview 
To ensure the most appropriate model was used for the review of USAF policy, 
this research first modeled the problem as a way to tie the many variables together.  In 
this chapter, the logical data and system dynamics mode ls that were first developed for 
this research are described in detail, to include the models’ entities, attributes, 
relationships, and feedback loops.  Afterwards, there is an explanation of why the CMU 
CERT technical staff’s Abstracted Common Model was selected as the basis for this 
research’s Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage.  The reasoning behind 
incorporating motivations, organizational priorities, and social networks is also presented.  
 
3.2 Logical Data Model 
 To better understand the insider threat problem, variables from the various insider 
threat models were incorporated into this research’s Insider Threat Logical Data Model.  
The attributes of the entities were listed out, as well as the relationships between the 
entities.  These entities were then tied together with the risk assessment elements (threat, 
vulnerability, likelihood, impact, and risk).  By examining their organizations through t he 
lens of this model, managers can identify what elements in their organization may be  
putting them at risk of an insider attack.   Hopefully, they can then work to decrease the 
vulnerabilities, threats, or both.  As mentioned in the last chapter, this model was inspired 
by Tuglular’s (2000) structural approach which outlined the elements and attributes 
which play a role in an insider attack.   
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 To make the model easier to read, Figure 15 includes all the entities and 
relationships but excludes the attributes.  The entities in the yellow-highlighted area 
(Area 1) are attributed to the insider, and those in the green-highlighted are related to the 
organization (Area 2).   The risk management entities are shaded in magenta (Area 3).  
Figures 16 through 20 depict portions of the model with all attributes and keys for the 
included entities. 
3.2.1 Entities of the Insider Threat Logical Data Model 
 This next section outlines each of the entities included in the Insider Threat 
Logical Data Model to include their attributes.   
3.2.1.1 Organization 
 There are elements of the organization itself that can play a role in determining 
whether it is at risk of an insider attack (see Figures 15 and 16).  These include the type 
of bus iness with which the organization is invo lved (e.g., military, education, or customer 
service), what it considers its priorities (e.g., reputation or profits) (Rich et al., 2005), and 
its propensity to trust its employees (McKnight et al., 1998). 
3.2.1.2 Control 
 The controls an organization chooses to implement to detect and protect it from 
insider attacks are also important entities to examine (see Figures 15, 16, and 19).  These 
controls usually fall into one of the following three categories: technical, formal, or 
informal (Melara et al., 2003); most likely an organization implements controls from all 
three categories.  The type of control can vary from monitoring (technical) to issuing 
sanctions (formal) (Cappelli et al., 2007) to organizational culture (informal) (Melara et 
al., 2003). 
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Figure 16. Organization and Related Entities 
 
 
3.2.1.3 System 
 Having an inventory of the organization’s systems is an important element in 
mitigating any type of security risk (Pipkin, 2000) (see Figures 15, 16, and 19).  The 
organization needs to know what resources it has, as well as prioritize them based on 
their value to the company.  A system’s priority can help an organization determine how 
much money and time it is willing to invest in order to protect it. 
 
 
INSIDER / 1
Insider_ID
Organization_ID  (FK)
First_Nm
Mid_Initial
Last_Nm
SSN
Job_Title
Insider_Type
Date_of_Employment
Date_of_Termination
ORGANIZATION / 13
Organization_ID
Type_of_Business
Org_Propensity_to_
Trust
Org_Priority
CONTROL / 14
Ctrl_ID
Organization_ID  (FK)
Ctrl_Category
Control_Type
SYSTEM / 23
System_ID
Organization_ID  (FK)
Priority
Is Subject Of
PProtects
POwns
P
Enacts
P
Employs
46 
 
 
Figure 17. Insider and Profile Entities 
 
3.2.1.4 Insider 
 The people potentially responsible for insider attacks must be tracked (see Figures 
15 through 19).  Basic information includes name, social security number, job title, date 
of employment, date of termination, and insider type (current or former employee, 
service providers, consultants, or contractors) (CSO, 2007). 
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3.2.1.5 Psychological Profile 
 As much as possible, it is beneficial to have a psychological profile on all insiders 
(see Figures 15  and 17).  Obviously, this is more difficult for service providers, 
consultants, or contractors, but some personality traits and behaviors may be exhibited as 
insiders work with the organization.  Though there does not exist a profile for malicious 
insiders, the following traits and behaviors have historically been possessed or exhibited 
by malicious insiders: egotism, instability, malice, passion, dishonesty, risk taking, lack 
of self control, lack of strength of character, poor social skills, addictions, (Tuglular, 
2000), acting out of character, making alarming statements (Puleo, 2006), resistance to 
change (Robbins and Judge, 2008), and unordinary sexual behavior (Under Secretary for 
Management, 2006).   
3.2.1.6 Legal Profile 
 It is beneficial to know the criminal record of all insiders, to include previous 
offenses (see Figures 15 and 17).  Individuals who have broken the law in the past may 
be more inclined to do so again (Under Secretary for Management, 2006). 
3.2.1.7 Computer Use Profile 
 It is important to understand the typical computer usage patterns of each insider, 
to include the following: password failure pattern (Tuglular, 2000), documents read 
versus written ratio, documents printed, printing other users’ documents, number of 
databases accessed, latest work end time, and earliest work start time (Laird and Rickard, 
2005) (see Figures 15 and 17).  If while monitoring insiders, it is discovered that they are 
suddenly participating in activities that do not fit their normal pattern, the organization 
should be concerned and look into the situation.  It is also important to know of any 
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special activities, such as high usage of the file transfer protocol (FTP) or access to 
unusual websites, which they legitimately need for their job.  Awareness of these unique 
activities can help prevent the organization from examining false positives.  It is essential 
to know what pr ivi lege level the insiders have on the network and what resources they 
can access (Cappelli et al., 2007).   
3.2.1.8 Social Profile 
 It is beneficial to have insight into each insider’s personal life (see Figures 15 and 
17).  Once a baseline is established, an organization should be on the lookout for any 
changes, such as withdrawal from usua l hobb ies or soc ial groups, as they can be signs of 
the occurrence of a stressful event, such as a divorce.  The recommended attributes to 
track are marital status, number of dependents, relationship with family, memberships, 
hobbies, and community involvement (Tuglular, 2000). 
3.2.1.9 Economic Profile 
 Historically, economic factors have played a major role in motivating insiders to 
commit malicious acts (Tuglular, 2000) (see Figures 15 and 17).   In terms of sabotage, 
insiders may feel they have not received the promotion or raise that they think they 
deserve.  Individuals who are in financial trouble are more likely to find espionage an 
attractive option.  Attributes of this entity include insiders’ suspicious financial activity 
and financial stability or secur ity. 
3.2.1.10  Ideological Profile 
 It is also important to have insight into insiders’ roles in religion and politics 
(Tuglular, 2000) (see Figures 15 and 17).  Similar to the Social Profile entity, it is 
valuable to establish baselines and then watch for any changes, such as an individual’s 
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sudden withdrawal from or new membership in a church.  Involvement in a new religious 
or political organization could also have social or economic effects.     
3.2.1.11 Professional Profile 
 Insiders’ feelings towards and behavior in the workplace are also important 
factors in the insider threat problem (see Figures 15 and 17).  Again, some of these 
attributes may be kept internally by the insiders, though others could be expressed to co-
workers or supervisors.  To capture an accurate picture of an insider, the following 
factors should be identified: job satisfaction, organizational commitment, job 
involvement (Robbins and Judge, 2008), job security, job performance (e.g., absenteeism 
and not able to meet deadlines or handle appropriate workload) (Puleo, 2006), 
professional knowledge, professional skills, and intelligence (Tuglular, 2000). 
3.2.1.12 Event 
 Events such as change  in marital status or demotion can often be triggers for 
deviant behavior in the workplace (see Figures 15 and 18).  The events can either 
increase the insiders’ stress or decrease their expectation fulfillment.  Both of these can 
lead to an increase in insiders’ pe rsonal needs, which can in turn bring about additional 
harmful actions (Band et al., 2006).  The event can be nationwide (e.g., recession), 
organization-wide (e.g., restructuring, mergers, personnel cuts, or relocation), or at an 
individual level (e.g., death in the family,  health issues, or change in supervisor) 
(Cappe lli et al., 2007).  
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Figure 18. Insider and Related Entities 
 
3.2.1.13 Relationship 
Insiders’ social ties within the organization can either lead to or prevent them 
from participation in deviant behavior (see Figures 15 and 18).  If insiders have strong 
ties with co-workers, they are more reluctant to commit deviant behavior in the 
workplace that could jeopardize these relationships.  On the other hand, if insiders are in 
relationships with others who are committing malicious acts, they may be more inclined 
to follow suit (Theoharidou et al.,  2005). 
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Figure 19. Incident and Related Entities 
 
3.2.1.14 Motivation 
 All malicious insiders are motivated by something (see Figures 15, 18, and 19).  
Common motives in criminal behavior are money and revenge (Casey, 2004).   
Similar to psychological characteristics, insiders’ motivations may not be evident to 
anyone else.  If they do  divulge information regarding the nature of their motivation, then 
it should be recorded. 
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3.2.1.15 Incident 
If a technical incident does occur, many details should be investigated and 
recorded, especially since it may be a precursor to a larger, more damaging attack.  The 
organization should try to de termine the nature of the incident (intentional destruction, 
detrimental misuse, dangerous tinkering, or naive mistake) (see Figures 15 and 19).  It is 
important to note that acts that seem harmless could be malicious insiders’ attempts to 
test the security controls (Stanton, et al.,  2005).  A description of each incident should be 
recorded (for example, accessing unauthorized websites, installing unauthorized 
software, or creating covert channels) (Mills et al., 2009).  Additionally, it would be 
beneficial to know where the insider got the idea for the attack, (e.g., from Internet 
research or another employee), as well as the target, method, date, time, and place (e.g.,  
at work or via virtual private network [VPN]) (Tuglular, 2000). 
3.2.1.16 Threat 
 A threat is the potential of a threat-source (in this case a malicious insider) to 
trigger or exploit a vulnerability (see Figures 15, 19, and 20).  Examples include 
information disclosure and alteration of software.  Identifying potential threats is an 
important step in the risk management process; this activity should be completed by all 
organizations (Stoneburner et al., 2002).   
3.2.1.17 Vulnerability 
 A vulnerability is a flaw or weakness in a system within the organization that can 
be triggered or exploited (see Figures 15, 19, and 20).  Just as an organization needs to 
identify potential threats, it should also determine what its vulnerabilities are, especially 
since this is what adversaries do in order to increase their likelihood of success. Examples 
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of vulnerabilities include unpatched systems and terminated employees still having 
access to company resources (Stoneburner et al., 2002). 
3.2.1.18 Likelihood 
 In risk management, likelihood is the probability that a threat will be successfully 
exercised against a vulnerability (see Figures 15 and 20).  For each threat-vulnerability 
pair, an organization should determine if they think the likelihood is low, moderate, or 
high (Elky, 2006). 
 
Figure 20. Risk and Related Entities 
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3.2.1.19 Impact 
 In risk management, the impact of a threat-vulnerability pair is usually the 
combination of losses in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability, as well as effects 
on mission capability, assets, and human life (see Figures 15 and 20).  Organizations 
must determine for their particular organization what the predicted impact will be, 
usually using the categories of low, moderate, or high (Elky, 2006). 
3.2.1.20 Risk 
 Risk is determined by analyzing the predicted likelihood and impact of the threat 
exercising the vulnerability (see Figures 15 and 20).  Usually this is measured 
qualitatively as low, medium, high, or critical.  The risk management process assists 
organizations in deciding which threat-vulnerability pairs to address first (Mills et al.,  
2009).   
3.2.2 Relationships in the Insider Threat Logical Data Model 
 This section outline s the relationships included in the Insider Threat Logical Data 
Model (see Figure 15). 
• An Organization enacts Controls. 
The management of the organization is responsible for developing, enacting, and 
enforcing the controls (see Figure 16).   
• An Organization owns Systems. 
The organization owns the systems and the information in them, and therefore, it 
is responsible for protecting those systems (see Figure 16).   
 
 
55 
 
• An Organization employs Insiders. 
The management of the organization is the responsible for hiring, monitoring, 
evaluating, disciplining, promoting, and terminating employees (see Figure 16).   
• An Insider is the subject of a Control. 
Controls can be  directed at particular insiders, for example system administrators.  
Additionally, if an insider is issued a sanction, that individual is the subject of the 
control (see Figure 16). 
• An Insider is illustrated by a Psychological Profile. 
Each insider has a one psychological profile, which may be unique within the 
organization (see Figure 17). 
• An Insider is illustrated by a Legal Profile. 
Each insider has a one legal profile, which may be unique within the organization 
(see Figure 17). 
• An Insider is illustrated by a Computer Use Profile. 
Each insider has a one computer use profile, which may be unique within the 
organization (see Figure 17). 
• An Insider is illustrated by a Social Profile. 
Each insider has a one social profile, which may be unique within the 
organization (see Figure 17). 
• An Insider is illustrated by an Economic Profile. 
Each insider has a one economic profile, which may be unique within the 
organization (see Figure 17). 
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• An Insider is illustrated by an Ideological Profile. 
Each ins ide r has a one ideological profile, which may be unique within the 
organization (see Figure 17). 
• An Insider is illustrated by a Professional Profile. 
Each insider has a one professional profile, which may be unique within the 
organization (see Figure 17). 
• An Insider is involved in Relationships. 
Insiders are involved in a relationship with their supervisors.  They may be 
involved in many other relationships with co-workers as well (see Figure 18).   
• An Event happens to an Insider. 
Insiders are positively or negatively affected by nationwide, organization-wide, 
and individual- level events (see Figure 18). 
• An Insider is driven by Motivations. 
Insiders commit malicious acts due to at least one of the various motivational 
factors (see Figure 18). 
• A System contains a Vulnerability. 
An individual system may have one or more vulnerabilities.  Also, a single 
vulnerability can be present in and affect multiple systems or possibly the 
organization as a whole (see Figure 19).   
• An Insider is the source of a Threat. 
Within this discussion of insider threat, all the threat-sources are insiders (see 
Figure 19).   
 
57 
 
• A Technical Incident results from a Motivation. 
Insiders have at least one source of motivation for committing a technical incident 
(see Figure 19).   
• A Vulnerability is exploited in a Technical Incident. 
A technical incident is the pairing of a threat to a vulnerability (see Figure 19).   
• A Threat is realized in a Technical Incident. 
A technical incident is the pairing of a threat to a vulnerability (see Figure 19).   
• A Control is a result of a Technical Incident. 
A control may be introduced into the organization after the occurrence of an 
incident, whether it is new company-wide policy or a sanction issued to the 
insider who was the source (see Figure 19).   
• A Threat and Vulnerability have a Likelihood. 
A threat-vulnerability pair has a resulting likelihood (see Figure 20).   
• A Threat and Vulnerability have an Impact. 
A threat-vulnerability pair has a resulting impact (see Figure 20).   
• A Likelihood and Impact have a Risk value. 
A likelihood- impact pair has a risk value (see Figure 20).   
 
3.3 System Dynamics Model  
 Once the logical data model was completed, a system dynamics model was 
developed to explain how these entities affected each other (i.e., positively or negatively) 
and ultimately how they may increase or decrease a system’s level of risk in terms of the 
insider threat problem.  As mentioned in the last chapter, this research’s Insider Threat 
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System Dynamics Model (see Figure 21) was greatly inspired by the CMU CERT 
technical staff’s abstract Model of the Insider IT Sabotage Problem (Moore et al., 2008).  
This model was chosen as it included more of the entities and attributes included in the 
Insider Threat Logical Data Model than any of the other mode ls, such as personal 
characteristics, organizational controls, trust, and events.  Many of the variables in the 
Ins ider Threat System Dynamics Model were purposefully named to provide consistency 
with the CMU model.   
 This next section describes the two variables at the heart of this model, 
Organizational Controls and Insider's Motivation to Commit Malicious Act, to include 
the interactions they have with each other as well as their relationships with the mode l’s 
other variables.  The incorporation of the risk management variables and the feedback 
loops within the model are also explained.  This model uses a ‘+’ sign for relationships 
with a pos itive correlation and ‘-’ for those with a negative correlation. 
3.3.1 Organizational Controls 
 An organization’s priorities play a role in how much it invests in controls, such as 
monitoring and training.  An organization that prioritizes reputations often invests more, 
while one that prioritizes profits invests less (Rich et al., 2005).  If the organization 
prioritizes a particular system, it usually spends more to protect it (Mills et al., 2009).  If 
an organization has a low amount of trust in its employees, it often spends mor e money 
on controls as it feels an attack is likely.  Similarly, if an organization begins to discover 
precursory incidents, it most likely increases controls, for example additional monitoring 
or issuing of sanctions (Moore et al., 2008).  
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3.3.2 Insider’s Motivation to Commit Malicious Act 
Insiders’ motivation to commit a malicious act can be increased by relationships 
with co-workers who are also committing such acts.  These co-workers can serve as poor 
role models.  On the other hand, relationships with co-workers who are not themselves 
committing malicious acts can decrease the motivation of insiders, as they would not 
want to jeopardize these relationships (Theoharidou et al., 2005).  Negative events, such 
as change in marital status, could also increase insiders’ motivation to attack (Puleo, 
2006).  A negative event can also lead to a decrease in insiders’ expectation fulfillment, 
which increases their unmet expectation level and subsequently their motivation to act 
(Moore et al., 2008). 
Insider precursors, in terms of legal, professional, and psychological traits and 
behaviors, can also increase insiders’ motivation.  For example, insiders who have had 
legal problems in the past, are egotistical, feel they deserve promotions (Tuglular, 2000), 
and are dissatisfied with their jobs (Puleo, 2006) could be more motivated to attack their 
company.  The psychological disposition of insiders may also lead them to have naturally 
higher expectations of the access and recognition they should receive at work.  As 
mentioned earlier, if expectations are not met, their motivation to attack can be increased 
(Moore et al., 2008). 
3.3.3 Relationships Between Insider’s Motivation and Organizational 
Controls 
 
Organizational controls can have two very different affects on ins ide rs’ 
motivation to act maliciously.  If there are many controls in place to monitor and audit 
employee activity, then the risk adversity of insiders often is increased, which in turn 
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decreases their motivation to act as they feel that the likelihood of being detected is 
greater.  On the other hand, if upset employees are issued sanctions (an increase in 
organizational controls), they may simply become more disgruntled and more likely to 
act (Cappelli and Moore, 2008).   
3.3.4 Incorporation of Risk Management 
In risk management, as either the number of threats or vulnerabilities to a system 
increase so does the likelihood of an attack to that system.  As either the likelihood or 
impact of an attack to a system increases so does the risk to that system.  Since the threats 
come from insiders, as their motivation increases so does the threat level.  Since 
organizational controls are enacted to protect the systems, as the number of controls 
increases, the number of vulnerabilities should decrease.  Additionally, if an organization 
recognized that a particular system had a high risk level, it would likely increase the 
number of controls in place to protect that system. 
3.3.5 Feedback Loops 
To align with the Model of the Insider IT Sabotage Problem (Moore et al.,  2008), 
the model in this paper incorporated the same feedback loops, described next. 
• Expectation Escalation (labe led R1- shown in red  on the mode l) 
If insiders have their expectations fulfilled, then often that simply raises 
the ir level of expectation for the future.  This is a reinforcing loop that could 
spiral out of control. 
• Escalation of Disgruntlement (labeled R2- shown in pink o n the mode l) 
If insiders are committing precursory technical incidents or displaying 
unusual behavior, these are either discovered or go undetected.  If precursors are 
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discovered, then organizational controls, such as monitoring and the issuing of 
sanctions, are increased.  This increase of organizational controls can increase the 
insiders’ disgruntlement.  In turn, this can increase their motivation to commit an 
act and lead to more precursory incidents or behaviors.  Again this is a reinforcing 
loop which can continuously escalate. 
• Intended Effects of Sanctions (labeled B1- shown in black on the mode l) 
The issuing of sanctions and increase of other organizational controls can 
have a very different effect on insiders.  If these controls increase insiders’ risk 
adversity, they may actually become less motivated to attack since they feel it is 
likely that they will be detected again.  This decrease in motivation can actually 
lessen the number of future precursory incidents or behaviors.  This is a balancing 
loop which works towards reaching the goal state of no or few precursors. 
• Unobserved Emboldening of Insider (labeled R3- shown in green on the mode l) 
If precursors go undetected, the insiders’ risk adversity is lowered and 
the ir motivation to act again is increased as they feel they could get away with 
malicious activity.  This often leads to additional acts.  This is a reinforcing loop; 
if the insiders’ actions continue to go undetected, they will continue to act. 
• Trust Trap (labeled R4- shown in orange on the model) 
If an organization has low trust in its employees, it usually invests more in 
controls, such as monitoring and auditing.  With more controls in place, the 
likelihood of an incident being detected is greater.  As more incidents are 
detected, the organization’s trust lowers even more, leading to additional controls.  
This is another reinforcing loop. 
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3.4 Selection of the Abstracted Common Model  
After the development of the logical data and system dynamics models, the final 
step before conducting the review of the USAF policies was to develop the model that 
would be used for comparison.  It was decided that first a previously published model 
would be selected as the basis.  From the review of the models described in Chapter II, 
the Abstracted Common Model was chosen as the most relevant and understandable for 
the audience of USAF leaders and supervisors.  Both insider espionage and sabo tage are 
concerns of the USAF; therefore, a model that focuses on the commonalties of these two 
problem areas is ideal.  Mitigating insider threat is a difficult and still fairly new problem.  
Measures that can help prevent two types of insider threat are therefore very attractive as 
they guide organizations as they begin to invest in fighting against the problem (Cappelli 
and Moore, 2008).  In addition, the fact that this model is abstract makes it easier to 
decipher for those who are not necessarily information technology or system dynamics 
experts.  Also, the CMU CERT technical staff focused on describing the balancing and 
reinforcing feedback loops as they found those to be of utmost interest to business 
managers (Cappelli and Moore, 2008).  
To ensure that all the variables were incorporated, the Insider Threat Logical Data 
Model and the Insider Threat System Dynamics Model were compared with the 
Abstracted Common Model.  Three areas of focus in this research’s models were not 
completely addressed and were therefore incorporated.  The resulting mod el, the Insider 
Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage Model, was then used during the policy 
review.     
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3.5 Modification of the Abstracted Common Model  
The three areas of the insider threat problem that were covered in this research’s 
models but not, or not fully, in the Abstracted Common Model were motivations, 
organizational priorities, and social networks.  The incorporation of these variables into 
this research’s Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage (see Figure 22) is 
explained in the next sections.  The importance of these factors in the insider threat 
problem is explained, as well as their specific relevance to the USAF.  These variables 
were integrated to enhance the comprehensiveness of the policy review. 
3.5.1 Insider Motivations 
While the Abstracted Common Model does not include an Insider Motivation 
variable, its variable Personal Needs (highlighted in yellow in Figure 22) embodies this 
factor of the insider threat problem.  The paper “Comparing Insider IT Sabotage and 
Espionage: A Model-Based Analysis,” (Band et al., 2006) from which the Abstracted 
Common Model comes, has some discussion about this connection of motivations to 
needs, but there can be a more robust relationship explained between these two, using 
Casey’s (2004) six types of motives. 
• Power reassurance is the need to boost one’s self-confidence.  For example, the 
ins ide rs may feel the need to prove to themselves that they can successfully 
accomplish the act at hand (Mills et al., 2009). 
• Power assertive is the need for recognition, usually to boost one’s self-worth 
(Shaw et al., 1998). 
• Anger retaliatory is the need for revenge (Mills et al., 2009). 
65 
 
• Anger excitation is the need to gain pleasure from causing harm to the 
organization and its members (Mills et al., 2009). 
• Opportunistic is the need to achieve satisfaction (Mills et al., 2009). 
• Profit is the need for money (Shaw et al., 1998). 
 
In order to detect which insiders may potentially be malicious, it is important for 
an organization to comprehend why they would decide to attack.  The USAF conducts 
background investigations on its employees to determine their security clearance level.  
An investigator discovering an individual has financial prob lems is a concern as it could 
indicate this individual is susceptible to adversaries approaching him to commit 
espionage (Under Secretary for Management, 2006).  Additionally, the USAF recently 
went through a period of reductions in force.  There are many documented cases of 
terminated employees becoming disgruntled and plotting revenge on their organizations 
(McMillan, 2009).  If stressful or unfavorable events occur, it is important to understand 
how they can affect a person’s motivation and likelihood to attack.  
3.5.2 Organizational Priorities 
Another concept that was not included in the Abstracted Common Model was that 
of organizational priorities and how they affect organizational controls and spending 
(Rich et al., 2005).  An organization that highly prioritizes profits may be less likely to 
invest money into information technology security.  Often this results from the fact that 
the return on investment with preventive measures can be extremely hard to calculate.  
An organization may not even know whether an implemented measure is deterring   
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 Figure 22. Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage 
 
attacks.  On the other hand, a company who highly values its reputation may be more 
inclined to invest in security measures, as it cannot afford a publicized security breach 
(Rich et al., 2005).  By incorpo rating these variables into the mode l, an organization can 
assess how its stance on profits versus reputation can affect its likelihood of detecting, 
deterring, and preventing malicious attacks.  It is also important to note that insiders are 
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usually pr ivy to the company’s stance on secur ity and know how wise it is to attempt an 
attack. 
This issue of prioritization is a difficult one of the USAF.  As a responsible 
steward of its Congressional budget the USAF must make wise investments in security 
measures.  On the other hand, the USAF is responsible for protecting vital information 
and information systems related to national security and therefore aims for robust 
security.  Determining the appropriate balance is a challenge and can have affects on 
mitigating threats from malicious insiders.   
To incorporate these concepts into the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and 
Espionage two additional variables were created (highlighted in green in Figure 22).  The 
variable Organization's Prioritization of Profit is negatively correlated with Auditing and 
Monitoring given that an organization which prioritizes profits does not invest as much in 
monitoring and auditing its employees.  This results in fewer harmful actions being 
discovered.  It also does not spend as much money in training its employees which can 
lead to employees not discovering unusual or malicious behavioral or technical incidents.  
Therefore, it is also negatively correlated with the variable and Detecting Concerning 
Behavior and Technical Actions.  The second new variable Organization's Prioritization 
of Reputation will be positively correlated with both Auditing and Monitoring and 
Detecting Concerning Behavior and Technical Actions as this type of organization is 
willing to invest the money in training, monitoring, and auditing, which increases its 
likelihood of detecting behavioral and technical precursors. 
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3.5.3 Social Networks 
Though the CMU CERT technical staff members are look ing to integrate social 
networks into future mode ls, they have not yet (Cappelli and Moore, 2008).  As discussed 
earlier, insiders can be affected either negatively or positively by relationships with their 
co-workers.  Having relationships with upstanding co-workers may deter insiders from 
doing harm to the organization as they do not wish to risk these relations hips, either by 
the ir co-workers’ disapproving of their actions or the company firing them.  This is due to 
the Social Bond Theory (Theoharidou et al., 2005).  For example, past research has 
shown a strong negative correlation between co-worker satisfaction and unexcused 
absenteeism.  The researcher theorized that the employees did not want to jeopardize the 
professional relationships they had made by exhibiting deviant behavior (Blau, 1985).  
Additionally, insiders with strong ties within the organization may not want to br ing harm 
to their co-workers in terms of loss in revenue, unrenewed contracts, and tarnished 
reputation, which can all result from a successful attack (Theoharidou et al., 2005). 
Strong relationship ties in the workplace have been shown to have other pos itive 
effects, like a sense of community, better communication, and enhanced understanding of 
the mission of other areas of the organization.  The “Rule of 150” describes the supported 
theory that organizational units with more than 150 members are too large to benefit from 
many of these positive effects of social networks as the relationships do not develop.  In 
large organizations, employees can feel insignificant and not part of a cohesive team 
(Gladwell, 2002). 
By examining the two case studies discussed in this research, it is evident that 
neither Robe rt Hanssen nor Timothy Lloyd had s trong soc ial ties that they were 
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concerned about breaking.  Hanssen was an introvert with poor social skills (Cooper and 
Garvey, 2001).  He did not relate well with co-workers; there are reports of him sexually 
harassing and physically assaulting FBI co-workers (Havill, 2001a;  Havill, 2001b).  He 
also reprimanded their social behavior and hacked into their computers just for enjoyment 
(Havill, 2001b).  During the end o f his time with Omega, Lloyd lashed out at and tried to 
sabotage co-workers (Melara et al., 2003). 
Per the Soc ial Learning Theory, having relationships with co-workers who 
themselves are committing malicious acts or planning to do so may actually increase the 
insiders’ likelihood of participating in deviant behavior (Theoharidou et al., 2005).  The 
insiders may look at these other individuals as role models or people they wish to 
impress.  The likelihood of such an individual following suit is increased if these deviant 
co-workers are not being detected or disciplined.    
As organizations are designed or restructured, the effects of social networks is 
important to keep in mind for various reasons, from morale to performance.  The USAF 
strongly promotes teamwork within its organizations which could benefit the USAF in 
terms of the insider threat problem.  There is a concern though regarding how frequently 
active duty members change units and even bases.  It is important to ensure they become 
part of the team when arriving at a new workplace. 
These two concepts are incorporated into the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage 
and Espionage (highlighted in magenta in Figure 22) by including two variables, each of 
which has an effect on Personal Needs.  The first new variable Positive Relationships 
with Co-Workers has a negative correlation with Personal Needs, given that those healthy 
relationships should decrease insiders’ need or desire to commit harmful actions.  The 
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second variable Negative Relationships with Co-Workers should have pos itive 
correlations with Personal Needs, given that those unhealthy relationships should 
increase insiders’ need or desire to commit harmful actions. 
 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter presented this research’s Insider Threat Logical Data Model and 
Insider Threat System Dynamics Model, to include the models’ entities, attributes, 
relationships, and feedback loops.  This chapter also explained the selection of the 
Abstracted Common Model and the additions made to it, resulting in the Insider Threat 
Model for Sabotage and Espionage, which is used in the USAF policy review.   
Chapter IV presents the methodology used for reviewing the DoD and USAF 
policies in terms of the best practices published by the CMU CERT technical staff and 
the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage.  The results of the policy review 
are discussed, including which practices and variables were addressed, which were not 
covered, and which were in conflict with the policies.  The chapter then presents 
recommendations that could help the USAF to address the shortfalls and conflicts.  Lastly 
the chapter proposes three new best practices that can be used by any organization.   
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IV. Policy Review 
 
 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter discusses the methodology used to review the DoD and USAF 
policies, both in terms of the best practices published by the CMU CERT technical staff 
this research’s Insider Threat Model for Sabo tage and Espionage.    For each best practice 
or model variable, this research shows to what degree the policies covered it, to include 
actors, tools, and areas of focus, such as specific systems, types of insiders, or activities.  
Additionally, there is a discussion of the shortfalls and conflicts identified in the policies.  
This chapter presents recommendations aimed to assist the USAF in better mitigating the 
insider problem.  Lastly the chapter offers three new best practices that can be adopted by 
any organization.  While this chapter summaries the findings, a more detailed breakdown 
is included in Appendix A. 
 
4.2 Methodology of the Policy Review 
After the completion of this research’s Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and 
Espionage, the methodology for the review of the DoD and USAF policies needed to be 
designed.  For this review, a pure naturalistic-qualitative strategy was used, from Patton’s 
2002 “Integrated Model of Measurement, Design, and Analysis” (Trochim and Donnelly,  
2007).  This strategy began with a naturalistic inquiry; in this case, “Based on its written 
policies, how well postured is the Air Force to mitigate insider threats?”  The next step 
was to collect qualitative data (Trochim and Donnelly, 2007).  Currently, there are 
hundreds of DoD and USAF policies; therefore, this research looked at a sampling that 
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relate to information assurance (IA) and security, network operations, personnel security, 
and special investigations.  The sample size grew during the analysis phase as selected 
policies referenced to others which, after being evaluated, were added to the sample.   
The sample consists primarily of USAF documents, including Air Force 
Instructions (AFI), Manuals (AFMAN), and Policy Directives (AFPD).  Three DoD-level 
documents were also analyzed as they are fundamental publications, often the foundation 
for the policies developed by the individual military branches, to include the USAF.  
Additionally, the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to 
Classified Information” were reviewed.  These guidelines are approved by the President 
of the United States and used by all government agencies; the USAF does not have its 
own set. 
  The reviewed documents are listed below, grouped into the following four 
categories: IA and security, network operations, personnel security, and special 
investigations.  For each category, the observables to which they relate are listed and 
highlighted in the “Cyber Event/Observable Taxonomy” (repeated in Figure 23 for the 
reader’s convenience). 
• IA and Security (highlighted in yellow) 
o Observables:
o DoD 8500.01E: Information Assurance (IA) (Department of Defense, 2002) 
 physical access, materials transfer to handlers, reconnaissance, 
other actions, exfiltration, communication (cyber),  manipulation, counter 
detection 
o DoD 8500.02:  Information Assurance (IA) Implementation (Department of 
Defense, 2003) 
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o DoD 8570.01-M: Information Assurance Workforce Improvement Program 
(Department of Defense, 2005) 
o AFI 31-401:  Information Security Program Management (Department of the 
Air Force, 2005a)  
o AFI 33-204: Information Assurance (IA) Awareness Program (Department of 
the Air Force, 2004c) 
o AFI 33-230: Information Assurance Assessment and Assistance Program 
(Department of the Air Force, 2004d) 
o AFMAN 33-223: Identification and Authentication (Department of the Air 
Force, 2005c) 
o AFPD 33-1: Information Resource Management (Department of the Air 
Force, 2006c) 
o AFPD 33-2: Information Assurance (IA) Program (Department of the Air 
Force, 2007) 
o AFPD 33-3: Information Management (Department of the Air Force, 2006d) 
• Network Operations (highlighted in green)  
o Observables:
entrenchment, exfiltration, communication (cyber), manipulation, counter 
detection 
 violations, physical access, reconnaissance, other actions,  
o AFI 33-115, Volume 1: Network Operations (Department of the Air Force, 
2006a) 
o AFI 33-115, Volume 2: Licensing Network Users and Certifying Network 
Professionals (Department of the Air Force, 2004a) 
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o AFI 33-115, Volume 3: Air Force Network Operations Instructions 
(Department of the Air Force, 2004b) 
o AFI 33-202, Volume 1: Network and Computer Security (Department of the 
Air Force, 2006b) 
o AFI 33-207: Computer Security Assistance Program (Department of the Air 
Force, 1997) 
• Personnel Security (highlighted in magenta) 
o Observables:
o Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified 
Information (Under Secretary for Management, 2006) 
 polygraph results, communications, failure to report (finance, 
travel, contacts), counter intelligence, foreign travel, personal conduct, social 
activity, other actions 
o AFI 31-501: Personnel Security Program Management (Department of the Air 
Force, 2005b) 
• Special Investigations (highlighted in blue) 
o Observables:
o AFI 71-101, Volume 4: Counterintelligence (Department of the Air Force, 
2000) 
 polygraph results, communications, failure to report (finance, 
travel, contacts), counter intelligence, foreign travel, personal conduct, social 
activity, other actions 
o AFPD 71-1: Special Investigations (Department of the Air Force, 1999) 
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Figure 23. Cyber Event/Observable Taxonomy (Mills et al., 2009) 
 
 The next step was to perform a content analysis on these documents.  The 
approach used in this research was a combination of a directed and a summative approach 
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2005).  The directive nature stems from the fact that it was based on 
the research previously conducted by the CMU CERT technical staff members, to include 
their Abstracted Common Model and published best practices (described in the next 
section) (Cappelli et al., 2006).  CMU CERT’s technical staff provided the overarching 
concepts which gave necessary direction to the general research question, known as a 
deductive category application (Mayring, 2000).  These works are felt to be trustworthy 
as the CMU CERT technical staff has been working on the insider threat problem for 
over six years and has published numerous repor ts on the subject.  Add itionally, the staff 
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is sponsored by and has worked with such groups as the United States Secret Service, 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Personnel Security Research 
Center, and many civilian organizations.  These works were not produced specifically in 
regards to or on behalf of the USAF, and it is believed that they not biased towards how 
the USAF is doing in its fight against insider attacks. 
 The content analysis also took a summative approach in terms of examining 
specific key words for each best practice and variable within the Insider Threat Model for 
Sabotage and Espionage.  The analys is, conducted by hand, began with certain key words 
and phrases with additional words and phrases being added as the analysis progressed.  A 
latent content analysis was conducted as the concern was not simply the word count but 
the interpretation of the policies which included these key words and phrases.  Some 
policy statements included the key words and phrases but were found to have no 
relevance to the insider threat problem.  Those passages that did relate to this research 
were recorded and examined to see what insight they provided on the actors involved in 
implementing the policy, tools used by these individuals, and specific areas of interest, to 
include particular systems, types of insiders, or activities.  For example, section 3.8.1.3. 
from AFI 33-202, Volume 1 reads,  
 Information Protection Operations (IPO) personnel in the NCC will check 
for antivirus signature files/datfiles upda tes daily from the AFCERT/DoD 
CERT sites. Users will pull down new signature files from the NCC-
controlled site or NCC’s site will replicate (if feasible) new signature files 
to the users as soon as received. Accomplish a virus scan immediately 
following an update of a signature file” (Department of the Air Force, 
2006b).   
 
This passage has the key word “antivirus” which is linked with best practice number 7, 
“Actively defend against malicious code” (see next section).  After reading this passage, 
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it is clear that it does indeed relate to protecting the USAF network from malicious code, 
which some malicious insiders use to commit sabotage.  IPO personnel are responsible 
for executing this po licy item, and they use the AFCERT and DoD CERT websites and 
virus scans as tools.  There is a focus on using signature-based tools and ensuring 
signature files are updated daily. 
Once all of the policies were individually analyzed, a summary was developed 
that addressed to what extent each best practice or variable from the model is covered in 
the policies, to include shortfalls and conflicts.  Additionally, overall recommendations 
were generated to address the areas which need improvement.   
4.2.1 Best Practices for Mitigating Insider Threat 
After conducting years of research on the insider threat problem and formulating 
multiple models on the subject, the CMU CERT technical staff has published two 
versions of the “Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Ins ide r Threats” 
(2006).  The following list is a compilation of the best practices from the second version 
of this report and the recommendations for future research made by the CMU CERT 
technical staff in its comparison of insider sabotage and espionage (Band et al., 2006).  
As mentioned earlier, each policy document was analyzed to see if it incorporates these 
best practices.  For each one, the analysis looked for the following key words and 
phrases:  
1. Institute periodic enterprise-wide risk assessments. 
In order to protect its information resources, an organization must identify 
possible threats and vulnerabilities, determining both their likelihood and impact.  
The organization must factor in insiders as potential threat-sources.  The 
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organization must balance the costs, to include money and employee morale, 
against the benefits of enhanced security.  Risk assessments can assist it in 
accomplishing this (Cappe lli et al., 2006). 
Key words and phrases
2. Institute periodic security awareness training for all employees. 
: controls, countermeasures, critical assets, flaws, 
impact, likelihood, mitigate, prioritization, risk analysis, risk assessment, risk 
management, risk mitigation, threat, vulnerability 
Management must develop a culture of awareness of insider threats, and 
an effective way to do this is through training.  Employees must understand the 
policies in place, why it is important that they are enforced, and the repercussions 
if they are not (Cappelli et al., 2006).   
Key words and phrases
3. Enforce separation of duties and least privilege. 
: awareness, certification, education, espionage, IA, 
insider threat, licensing, objectives, orientation, sabotage, social engineering, 
training 
If the responsibility for essential functions is distributed amongst many 
employees, the power of a single individual is reduced.  In this situation, it would 
be more difficult for an employee to execute a successful incident of espionage or 
sabotage without the assistance of others.  The security policy of least privilege is 
also important as it gives employees access only to the resources they need to 
successfully complete their duties (Cappe lli et al., 2006). 
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Key words and phrases
4. Implement strict password and account management policies and practices. 
: least privilege, need-to-know, privileged access, 
role-based access, separation of duty, separation of function, two-person 
compliance 
This is one of the most basic preventive measures; it is absolutely essential 
to ensure authentication and non-repudiation.  If insiders are restricted from 
certain functions due to the policy of least privilege but can compromise other 
employees’ accounts, they can still launch attacks (Cappe lli et al., 2006). 
Key words and phrases
5. Log, monitor, and audit employee online actions. Collect and save data for use in 
investigations. 
: account review, accountability, authentication, 
backdoors, biometrics, common access card (CAC), identification, login, network 
user licensing, non-repudiation, passwords, public key encryption, social 
engineering, user account, user privilege 
By implementing this measure, an organization may be able to identify 
technical precursors which are warning signs of a future attack.  If noticed in time 
and dealt with appropriately, the organization may be able to prevent a damaging 
attack.  These logs of employee activity should be maintained in case they are 
needed as evidence in an investigation (Cappelli et al., 2006). 
   Key words and phrases
 
: audit, bypass, cataloging, consent to monitoring, 
file modifications, firewall, log, monitor, network traffic, privilege change, traffic 
analys is, unauthor ized transmissions, VPN 
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6. Use extra caution with system administrators and privileged users. 
These administrators and privileged users hold a lot of power as they are 
typically the employees who set or implement the policies, as well as monitor the 
network resources.  They can be in the best position to access information or 
deploy an attack, as well as cover up their tracks (Cappelli et al., 2006). 
Key words and phrases
7. Actively defend against malicious code. 
: backup operators, privileged access, privileged 
user, security manager, system administrators 
Many sabotage attacks involve the deployment of malicious code such as 
logic bo mbs.  Though there is no too l that perfectly detects these, security 
measures should be in place to try to do so, such as looking for the signatures of 
known viruses (Cappe lli et al., 2006). 
Key words and phrases
8. Use layered defense against remote attacks. 
: anomaly, antivirus, baseline, hash function, 
malicious code, malicious logic, signature, Trojan horse, viruses, worm 
Many attackers have been more comfortable executing their malicious 
actions from a remote location, away from the eyes of co-workers and managers.  
Therefore security measures and policies regarding remote access must be sound 
and well executed (Cappelli et al., 2006). 
Key words and phrases
 
: demilitarized zones, proxy, remote access, remote 
dial- in/dial-out communications, VPN  
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9. Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive behavior. 
Mitigating insider threat requires a team effort.  All members of the 
organization should be watchful of unusual behavior of their co-workers, and 
there should be procedures in place allowing them to report anything suspicious.  
In particular, supervisors need training in this area (Cappe lli et al., 2006).   
Key words and phrases
10. Deactivate computer access following termination. 
: acting out of character, alarming statements, 
alcohol, Article 15, bankruptcy, behavior, counseling, courts-martial, criminal 
activity, drug, embezzlement, espionage, financial irresponsibility, foreign 
intelligence, foreign travel, gambling, IA security event/incident, indebtedness, 
letters of reprimand, mental health, misuse of government property, network 
security event/incident, report, reportable information, sabotage, stress, spy, 
suspicious activities, terrorism, theft, treason, unauthorized access, unauthorized 
release, unauthorized technology transfer, unfavorable information, Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), work performance 
The organization should have strict procedures in place to disable all 
access paths of employees who have been terminated.  The lack of such 
procedures has been detrimental to organizations in the past (Cappe lli et al., 
2006). 
Key words and phrases
 
: departure, deleting user accounts/passwords, 
disabling user account/password, retire, separation, termination 
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11. Implement secure backup and recovery processes. 
In the event of a successful attack, an organization may be able to lessen 
the negative impact by having backup copies of its information (Cappelli et al.,  
2006).  Management should examine the procedures for creating and maintaining 
backup materials as an insider, such as Timothy Lloyd, may increase the impact 
of his attack by reducing the existence of or stealing the backup resources (Melara 
et al., 2003). 
Key words and phrases
12. Analyze current access control policies and practices; identify and evaluate 
options to mitigate insider threat risk.   
: backup, contingency, continuity of operations, 
disaster, ghost image, recovery, redundancy 
Both physical and electronic access paths must be identified, monitored, 
and tightly controlled by management (Band et al., 2006).  Malicious insiders 
have often used access paths that are unknown to the organization to commit their 
attacks.   
Key words and phrases
13. Clearly Document Insider Threat Controls 
: access, Access Control List (ACL), 
authentication, backdoor, classification, classified information/media/product, 
clearance, control, IA awareness/training, identification, investigation, licensing, 
need-to-know, privilege, qualification, remote access, SIPRNET, unauthorized 
connection 
Organizations should document all insider threat controls, make sure 
employees understand these controls, and address violations of such controls 
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(Cappe lli et al., 2006).  Controls are not enforceable if employees are not made 
aware of them (Pipkin, 2000). 
Key words and phrases
4.2.2 Variables of the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage 
: insider threat control, insider threat 
countermeasures 
 Each document from Section 4.2 was also examined to see if it addresses the 
variables from the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage.  Below is the list of 
the variables as well as whether they are addressed by one of the CMU CERT technical 
staff’s best practices.  If they are not, this research specifically analyzed if and how the 
USAF policies address them.  For each of the following variables, any additional key 
words or phrases not mentioned above are listed: 
• Auditing and Monitoring: addressed by best practice number 5, “Log, monitor, 
and audit employee online actions.” 
• Discovering Unauthorized Access: addressed by best practice number 12, 
“Analyze current access control policies and practices; identify and evaluate 
options to mitigate insider threat risk. ”   
• Discovering Harmful Actions: addressed by best practice number 5, “Log, 
monitor, and audit employee online actions.”  
• Detecting Concerning Behavior and Technical Actions: addressed by the 
following best practices: 
o Number 5, “Log, monitor, and audit employee online actions.”  
o Number 9, “Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive behavior.” 
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o This research also looks at how USAF policies detect prior concerning 
behavior through the use of the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining 
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information.” 
• Sanctions 
o Sanctions due to employee behavior are addressed by best practice number 9, 
“Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive behavior.”  
o While best practice number 2, “Institute periodic security awareness training 
for all employees,” addresses informing employees of the repercussions of 
violating security measures, it does not address issuing of sanctions.  This 
research also looks at whether USAF policies mandate that supervisors or 
commanders issue sanctions to employees for inappropriate technical acts. 
o Key words and phrases
• Enforcing Authorization Level Using Access Control : addressed by best practices 
: access, employee intervention, loss of clearance, 
network  license, Security Information File (SIF), suspension 
o Number 3,” Enforce separation of duties and least privilege.” 
o Number 4, “Implement strict password and account management policies and 
practices.” 
o Number 6, “Use extra caution with system administrators and privileged 
users.”  
o Number 8, “Use layered defense against remote attacks.” 
o Number 10, “Deactivate computer access following termination.” 
o Number 12, “Analyze current access control policies and practices; identify 
and evaluate options to mitigate insider threat risk.” 
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• Insider Access- this variable is strongly related to the previous one, and therefore 
is addressed by the same best practices listed on the previous page 
• Organization's Prioritization of Profit 
o Not addressed by the best practices  
o Key words and phrases
• Organization's Prioritization of Reputation 
: prioritization, priority, profit  
o Not addressed by the best practices 
o Key words and phrases
• Organization's Trust of Insider 
: prioritization, pr iority, reputation 
o Addressed in part by best practice number 1, “Institute period ic enterprise-
wide risk assessments.” 
o This research also looks for any other determinants of trust 
o Key words and phrases
• Organization Perceived Risk : addresses by best practice number 1, “Institute 
periodic enterprise-wide risk assessments.” 
: ability, benevolence, integrity, trust, trustworthiness 
• Insider Stress 
o Addressed in part by best practice number 9, “Monitor and respond to 
suspicious or disruptive behavior.” 
o This research also looks for any policies that examination employee stress 
• Stressful Event: similar to “Insider Stress” 
o Addressed in part by best practice number 9, “Monitor and respond to 
suspicious or disruptive behavior.” 
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o This research also looks for any policies that call for the examination of 
stressful events in the employee’s life 
o Key words and p hrases
• Personal Predispositions 
: stressful event  
o Not addressed by the best practices  
o While predispositions may be difficult for an organization to identify, this 
research looks at any policies or procedures that try to glean insight into the 
employee’s psychological state, perhaps through talking with friends, family,  
and co-workers  
o Key words and phrases:
 Others: addiction, allegiance to the United States, dishonesty, disloyalty, 
dual citizenship, egotism, emotional condition, employment/service to 
foreign organization, irresponsibility, lack of candor, lack of sound 
judgment, malicious, mental condition, physical condition, resistant to 
change, sexual behavior, sexual deviance, social skills, unexplained 
affluence, unreliability, untrustworthy, violent behavior  
 Many of the same words as for best practice number 
9, “Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive behavior.”  Yet in this 
case, the behavior or activity occurred in the past, usually identified during a 
background investigation via the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining 
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information.” 
• Negative Relationships with Co-Workers 
o Not addressed by the best practices 
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o Key words and phrases
• Positive Relationships with Co-Workers 
: association, friendship, relationship, social influence, 
social network 
o Not addressed by the best practices  
o Key words and phrases
• Personal Needs: similar to Personal Predispositions 
: same as abo ve 
o Not addressed by the best practices  
o While needs may be difficult for an organization to identify, this research 
looks at any policies or procedures that try to glean insight into this, perhaps 
through talking with friends, family, and co-workers  
o Key words and phrases
 
: bankruptcy, business/financial/property interest in 
foreign country, disgruntlement, embezzlement, espionage, expectation, 
financial irresponsibility, foreign influence, gambling,  indebtedness,  
recognition, revenge, sadistic, satisfaction, treason, unexplained affluence 
4.3 Findings for Best Practices and Variables  
For each best practice or variable, this research discusses to what degree the 
policies implement it, as well as if there are any aspects that are not covered or any 
conflicts between the best practice or variable and the po licies.  Table 1 provides an 
overarching summary for each as well. 
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Table 1. Summary of Findings 
Best Practice or Model Variable  Overarching S ummary 
“Institute periodic enterprise-wide risk 
assessments” 
- Too much focus on threats and 
vulnerabilities, which is only part of the 
assessment process 
- Need to evaluate likelihood, impact, and 
controls 
“Institute periodic security awareness 
training for all employees” 
- Many requirements for IA training but very 
little mention of insider threat  
- No reference to training employees on 
detecting suspicious behavior 
“Enforce separation of duties and least 
privilege” 
- Widespread mandate for “need-to-
know” 
- Only a few specific examples of 
separation of duties (all technical) 
“Implement strict password and account 
management policies and practices” 
- Strong policies regarding authentication 
and identification  
- Fake accounts (“back doors”) not 
addressed 
“Log, monitor, and audit employee online 
actions.  Collect and save data for use in 
investigations” 
- Activities are mandated but lack of 
guidance on retention and activities for 
which to look  
- Time-consuming nature leads to it not 
being accomplished 
“Use extra caution with system 
administrators and privileged users” 
- Call for increased monitoring and 
visibility of privileged, fairly vague 
- No separation of duty requirements  
“Actively defend against malicious code” - Discuss signature based tools 
- No mention of anomaly-based 
“Use layered defense against remote 
attacks” 
- Privileged actions are discouraged 
- Approval author ity is unclear 
“Monitor and respond to suspicious or 
disruptive behavior” 
Does not include acting out of character, 
one-time incidents, poor job 
performance 
“Deactivate computer access following 
termination” 
- Policy is general 
- Unclear regarding who ensures this 
occurs 
“Implement secure backup and recovery 
processes” 
No guidance on what needs to be 
included (e.g., redundancy, ghost 
images) 
“Analyze current access control policies 
and practices; identify and evaluate options 
to mitigate insider threat risk” 
Further guidance needed regarding fake 
accounts, ACLs, system administrators, 
remote access 
“Clearly document insider threat controls” Few explicit references 
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“Sanctions” (for inappropriate technical 
acts) 
- Use SIF, suspension or loss of clearance, 
restriction of access 
- No mention of employee intervention 
“Organization's Prioritization of Profit” Not discussed 
“Organization's Prioritization of 
Reputation” 
Not discussed 
“Organization's Trust of Insider” Addressed in background investigation 
“Insider Stress” Not discussed 
“Stressful Event” Not discussed 
“Personal Predispositions” - Focus on conduct and behavior 
- Insight into personality not addressed 
“Negative Relationships with Co-Workers” - Discuss associations with persons 
committing criminal activity and 
sabotage 
- No discussion of parties involved in 
malicious technical activity 
“Positive Relationships with Co-Workers” Not discussed 
“Personal Needs” - Address finances and foreign influence 
- No discussion of revenge, recognition, 
self-confidence 
“Detecting Concerning Behavior and 
Technical  Actions” 
- Focus on mishandling of information 
- No discussion of suspicious behaviors 
 
4.3.1 Best Practice- “Institute periodic enterprise-wide risk assessments” 
 
The policies talk about identifying threats, vulnerabilities, controls, and risks, and 
they mandate the execution of risk assessments at all levels from the DoD Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) to personnel in the network control centers (NCC) to the 
information system security officer (ISSO) responsible for individual information 
systems.  The policies also establish a hierarchical structure that supports a strong 
communication flow of security information, to include new vulnerabilities and 
appropriate countermeasures.  Each level receives guidance from higher levels as well as 
reports to those levels of any security flaws or suspicious network behavior.   
Other actors who play a role in executing this best practice include the following: 
Defense Information Systems Network Designated Approving Authority (DISN DAA), 
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AF Communications Agency (AFCA), 92d Information Warfare Aggressor Squadron (92 
IWAS), AF Network Operations and Security Center (AFNOSC), and IA offices at the 
Major Command (MAJCOM), Numbered Air Force (NAF) and base levels.  These actors 
use many tools to complete the risk assessments to include information from the DoD 
CIO Annual IA Report, DoD uniform risk criteria, Information Assurance Vulnerability 
Alerts (IAVA) and bulletins (IAVB), and AF Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).  
They identify po tential risks through the adjudicative process, independent audits (to 
include Scope EDGE and 92 IWAS red teams), self-assessments, and certification and 
accreditation (C&A) process.  NCCs and ISSOs also utilize Vulnerability Assessment 
Tools, network vulnerability or penetration testing, and IA security incidents and patterns 
from network logs and scans.  The areas of focus addressed in the policies were systems 
at all levels (DoD, service, and base), interconnected systems, enclaves, wireless 
networks, port management, software patches, biometrics, directives and technical orders, 
system life-cycle documents, continuity of ope rations plans (CONOPS), and training and 
awareness programs. 
Though there is much discussion of identifying threats, vulnerabilities, and 
controls, there is little or no discussion regarding two vital steps in a risk assessment: 
likelihood determination and impact analysis.  AFI 33-115, Volume 1 does require 
AFNOSC, NOSCs, and NCCs to measure the impact of incidents that have occurred, but 
there is no discussion of these employees estimating the effects of an attack that could 
occur (Department of the Air Force, 2006a).  AFPD 33-2 was the only policy to mention 
that security measures invested into an information system should be “commensurate 
with the shared risk and potential harm that could result from disclosure, loss, misuse, 
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alteration, or  destruction of the information” (Department of the Air Force, 2007).  There 
are no policies regarding estimating the likelihood of a security incident.  Risk cannot 
truly be determined without a complete identification of likelihood and impact.  
4.3.2 Best Practice- “Institute periodic security awareness training for all 
employees” 
 
  The policies clearly address the goa ls of the DoD and USAF to ensure all 
employees receive both initial and annual refresher IA training.  There is also discussion 
of providing an increased depth for students who may become involved in planning, 
programming, managing, operating, or maintaining information systems.  Lead actors 
include the DoD CIO, Air Education and Training Command (AETC), United States Air 
Force Academy, AFCA, IA offices, unit commanders, unit IA awareness managers, and 
the end users (to include military, civilian, guard, reserve, government contractors, and 
foreign national employees).  These actors use initial military training, Air University 
courses, civilian career programs, the “Air Force Information Assurance Awareness 
Training” computer-based training (CBT), the USAF IA Home Page 
(https://private.afca.af.mil/ip), the DoD CIO Annual IA Report, Counterintelligence 
Awareness Briefings, pamphlets, posters, screen savers, and videotapes in order to teach 
personnel IA concepts, measures, and tactics.   
The major areas of focus for these training programs and materials are as follows: 
authorized and proper use of information systems and the Internet; account and password 
policies; threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures; privacy rights and consent to 
monitoring; responsibilities of responding to and reporting suspicious activities and 
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conditions (e.g., social engineering and threats from foreign entities); and duty to protect 
information systems.   
While the concepts listed above factor into the insider threat problem, there are 
few specific references to insider threat.  DoD 8570.01-M does require IA training to 
include “examples of internal threats such as malicious or incompetent authorized users, 
users in the employ of terror ist groups or foreign countries, disgrunt led employees or  
Service members, hackers, crackers, and self- inflicted intentional or unintentional 
damage” (Department of Defense, 2005).  Despite this DoD mandate, only two USAF 
policies were found to explicitly address insider threats.  AFPD 33-2 calls for awareness 
briefings on “insider threat” from AFOSI (Department of the Air Force, 2007), and AFI 
33-204 states that one goal of IA awareness if for users to understand countermeasures to 
protect against sabotage and espionage (Department of the Air Force, 2004c).  In 
addition, DoD 8570.01-M specifically requires teaching users about social engineering 
risks, but this is the only document to mention social engineering; no USAF documents 
refer to it.  Furthermore, there is no discussion regarding malicious insiders employing 
social engineering tactics which the CMU CERT technical staff discusses in its 
“Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Inside r Threats” (Cappe lli et al.,  
2006).   
Another shortfall is the quality of training.  DoD 8570.01-M calls for IA training 
to be  
…current, engaging, and relevant to the target audience to enhance its 
effectiveness.  Its primary purpose is to influence behavior.  The focus 
must be on actions that empower the user to mitigate threats and 
vulnerabilities to DoD systems. Authorized users must understand that 
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they are a critical link in their organization’s overall IA posture 
(Department of Defense, 2005).   
 
The USAF’s main method for training is the IA CBT, but research has shown that 
training which involves face-to-face interaction is more successful, both in terms of 
effectiveness and satisfaction (Heinze, 2004).  While a study by Piccoli et al. (2001) did 
not find a decrease in training effectiveness within a virtual environment, the study’s 
participants did feel a significant shift of responsibility from the instructor to themselves 
and had problems adjusting to the learning environment.  DoD 8570.01-M recognizes 
that the user is essential in achieving a secure environment but may not be effectively 
sending this message through the current training program (Department of Defense, 
2005).  To mitigate insider threat it is indeed essential to gain the help of all employees, 
but the policies are not emphasizing the requirement to teach them about insider threat.  
Users are given the responsibility to report suspicious behaviors, but they are not  
provided with examples of malicious insider behavior might look like.  Additionally,  
some of the methods mentioned are not widely known about or  used, to include the 
USAF IA Home Page and AFOSI briefings.   
4.3.3 Best Practice- “Enforce separation of duties and least privilege” 
 The DoD and USAF offer strict guidelines about limiting information access.  
Holding a security clearance does not entitle an individual to all information at that level 
of classification; there also must be a valid work-related reason, or need-to-know.  The 
policies do focus on the security and protection of classified information, as well as 
military intelligence, proprietary information, and web sites containing official 
information.  There is also much oversight of access to privileged programs, utilities, 
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and files, such as system parameter and configuration files, databases, assemblers, 
debuggers, password files, and activity logs.  Special attention is paid to the access 
granted to joint and coalition partners and those only working within a unit for a short 
amount of time.  The main actors in implementing these policies include the AFNOSC, 
NOSCs, Top Secret Control Offices, IA personnel, system administrators, and all 
authorized users.   
 While there were a few areas that require separation of duties or two-person 
compliance (Time Compliance Network Orders [TCNO], Top Secret Control Accounts, 
and IA functions) they were all specifically related to information or information 
systems.  Besides TCNOs, there are no policies regarding NOSC and NCC functions 
establishing separation of duties.  It can be dangerous not to have checks and balances in 
place within the administration of the network and its vital systems.  Additionally, 
managerial, administrative, and personnel responsibilities should also be compliant with 
these security policies.  If one employee has too much power and is not being monitored, 
s/he may be able to cause harm and not even be detected.   
4.3.4 Best Practice- “Implement strict password and account management 
policies and practices” 
 
  The policies regarding password and account management cover two of the most 
important issues, accountability and non-repudiation.  In order to identify and possibly 
prosecute a malicious insider, an organization needs to be able to prove that the insider 
was indeed the executor of the attack.  Non-repudiation means that someone cannot deny 
or refute an action they have performed. The CAC has been implemented throughout the 
DoD as a method to provide improved network security and non-repudiation via digital 
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signatures. If an individual commits an attack using his network account while using a 
CAC and personal identification number (PIN), then it is much more difficult for that 
person to deny the event. While it is still possible that someone could have stolen the 
person’s CAC and compromised the PIN, it is generally accepted that the CAC/PIN 
combination provides a much higher level of security than a simple username/password 
combination.  
  DoD and USAF policies also implement strong identification and authentication 
procedures to include strict passwords requirements (when the CAC is not feasible) and 
biometrics.  They also require network security personnel to monitor accounts and 
actively search for vulnerabilities such as weak passwords.   The policies cover such 
topics as assigning, suspending, and deleting user IDs, passwords, and privileges; 
resetting passwords; updating e-mail addresses; one-time passwords; dormant accounts; 
rapid log-on retries; reusable generic or group usernames; remote sessions; and trusted 
profiles (e.g., system administrator, security officer, root user, super user, and backup 
operators).  Key players in implementing these policies are NOSCs, NCCs, system 
administrators, unit security manager, client suppor t administrators, and all users.  These 
personnel use too ls such as favorable background investigation, the Personnel Security 
Management Program, proper security clearances, password cracking tools and 
enforcement software, IA training, and internal and external assessments. 
  One of the major  shor tfalls in the DoD and USAF po licy is that there is no 
explicit check for the fake accounts (or “back doors”), which malicious insiders often 
create to conduct their activities.  There are policies regarding granting accounts (to 
include the requirements for a valid security clearance, background check, and IA 
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training), checking for dormant accounts, and terminating accounts, but in no document 
reviewed for this research was there a requirement for  a comparison of current users and 
active accounts.   
  As strong as network policies are in the DoD and USAF, most research shows 
that the greatest security shortfall is people.  Humans are susceptible to being lazy, 
complacent, forgetful, deceived, or malicious, which can all result in a security incident.  
For example, if while gone from their office, personnel leave their CACs in the ir 
computer and their pins or passwords written on a piece of paper in their desks, malicious 
insiders can access their accounts.  Employees may also give out their passwords to co-
workers before leaving for vacation or to a stealthy social engineer.  The policies are only 
as good as the users required to follow and enforce them.  Users must understand the vital 
role they play in information secur ity. 
4.3.5 Best Practice- “Log, monitor, and audit employee online actions.  
Collect and save data for use in investigations” 
 
  The reviewed policies cover the monitoring of activities such as logging into and 
modifying information on individual systems and the network.  Special attention is paid 
to suspicious activities such as changes to access controls, privileges, and passwords; 
unauthor ized transmissions or attempts to bypass security measures; unauthorized 
installation of modems; attempts to access activity logs; unsuccessful log-in attempts; and 
attempted or realized penetrations.  The policies also focus on protecting the core 
network services and devices, as well as VPN tunnels; this is important as many insiders 
launch attacks through VPN connections.  Network professionals are required to use 
these logs to identify weak configurations and security deficiencies.  Also all users are to 
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be informed that their activities on government systems are being monitored.  Lastly, it is 
stressed to associate any network incident with the responsible party, to enforce 
accountability and non-repudiation. 
  Important actors identified in these policies are system administrators, ISSOs, and 
computer network defense (CND) personnel.  These parties use the following tools: 
firewalls; log files pertaining to errors, network traffic, and intrusions; and,  when 
possible, automated responses of information systems to abort or suspend unauthorized 
user activity.    
 Though all network users are reminded of their consent to monitoring via pop-up 
messages on their computer screens and in their IA training, there is not  much attent ion 
paid to what types of activities are monitored.  There are also many other work-related 
activities that could be monitored, such as changes in arrival and departure times, printing 
or transmitting more files, or accessing files not needed for work.  While there is 
guidance requiring auditing, there is not much description regarding which specific 
activities to look and how long to retain the log files.  Between August 2005 and July 
2006, the DoD Inspector General (IG) found information assurance weaknesses due to 
audit trails during 6 out of 16 of their audits.  One finding was that standard procedures 
were not in place and reviews occurred informally, relying on “infinite permanency in 
personnel positions and consistent memory” (Department of Defense Office of Inspector 
General, 2006b).  Another issue is that there is not always sufficient time, personnel, and 
technology to audit logs effectively.   Another audit conducted by the DoD IG found that 
often the auditing o f log files did not occur because to do so was “cumbersome and time-
consuming” (Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2006b). 
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4.3.6 Best Practice- “Use extra caution with system administrators and 
privileged users” 
 
The DoD and USAF policies clearly outline the level of investigation needed for  
personnel in security management and administration jobs, paying particular attention to 
contractors and foreign nationals.  Additionally, AFI 33-202, Volume 1 and AFMAN 33-
223 both mandate that system administrators will not have “personal accounts with 
domain administrative privileges” (Department of the Air Force, 2006b; Department of 
the Air Force, 2005c).  The policies also focus on increased monitoring of users with 
access to Automated Information Systems and ensuring that security professionals only 
use i-TRM password cracking tools on the systems for which they have responsibility.  
Key actors are IA personnel, specifically managers, as well as the commanders 
and supervisors in charge of assigning personnel to these privileged positions.  In 
addition to background, local agency, and credit check investigations, these employees 
use CACs, hardware tokens, training and certification requirements, and Privileged 
Access Agreements to maintain visibility over these vital roles. 
As mentioned earlier, policies do require separation of duty among IA functions 
but do not state the same for other important security functions like system 
administration.  In add ition, the language used in these policies is not very c lear.  AFI 33-
202, Volume 1 calls for the wing IA office to maintain “visibility over all privileged user 
assignments” (Department of the Air Force, 2006b), and AFI 31-501 calls for 
“commanders and or supervisors [to] have ensured increased monitoring of the individual 
having AIS access” (Department of the Air Force, 2005b).  Both of these statements do 
not provide much guidance on the level of monitoring and visibility that is appropriate.  
99 
 
4.3.7 Best Practice- “Actively defend against malicious code” 
The policies reviewed for this research discussed many tactics for fighting against 
malicious viruses which may enter the network from various sources, to inc lude software, 
e-mail, and websites.  Vital actors include AFCA, AFNOSC, NOSCs, NCCs, IPO 
personnel, CND personnel, DAA, ISSO, CSA, and authorized users.  The antivirus too ls 
used by these employees are signature-based meaning that they look for known viruses.  
IPO personnel are required to check daily for new signature files from DoD and USAF 
Computer Emergency Response Team websites.   
Other areas of focus include wireless networks, freeware, firmware, shareware, 
public domain software, and removable and fixed media.   In addition to antivirus tools, 
these security personnel fight malicious code with software patches, security fixes, 
configuration management, malicious logic reports, and user awareness training.  One 
theme within these policies is to protect the systems by limiting the modifications that a 
typical network user can make to an information system, thereby elimina ting the chance 
of them introducing malicious code to the organization.  Similar to the results described 
earlier, the hierarchical structure of the DoD and USAF is utilized to assist in the defense 
of malicious code, especially in regards to the latest information flowing down to the 
NCCs.   
While signature-based tools can be very effective at detecting known attacks, they 
cannot detect modified or new attacks.  It is advisable to have anomaly-based tools which 
detect abnormal events, traffic, or configurations (Grimaila, 2008).  These were not 
discussed in the reviewed policies.   
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4.3.8 Best Practice- “Use layered defense against remote attacks” 
The policies mandate the use of proxy services and demilitarized zones to protect 
the information resources while allowing remote access for telework.  In addition, the 
execution of privileged actions during a remote session is highly discouraged.  IAMs and 
IAOs are required to maintain and review access and activity logs of all remote sessions, 
paying close attention to any privileged actions, if they are allowed.  The policies also 
prohibit the call- forwarding capability on modems and call for the disconnection of 
sessions after 15 minutes of inactivity.  The NOSCs and NCCs play the prominent roles 
in executing and enforcing these policies, and they use such tools as VPN client software, 
access tables, and screened subnets. 
There is no discussion in the po licy regarding who the app roval authority is for  
allowing remote access and deciding what functions may be executed remotely.  
Additionally, there is no explicit policy regarding the termination of remote access; they 
may be handled like all other network accounts.  Organizations need to handle remote 
access very carefully as malicious insiders often feel more comfortable doing harm from 
outside the office where they are not physically being monitored (Cappelli et al., 2006). 
4.3.9 Best Practice- “Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive 
behavior” 
 
The policies focus on the following types of behaviors: criminal activities, 
technical incidents, financial problems, and family issues.  Examples of concerning 
behavior are indebtedness, child or spouse abuse, action threatening network security, 
request for unauthorized access to controlled information, unauthorized technology 
transfer, and contact with a known or suspected foreign intelligence officer or foreign 
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diplomatic establishment.  AFPD 71-1 mandates the AFOSI to conduct counterespionage 
operations (Department of the Air Force , 1999).  The other major actors are the Central 
Adjudication Facility (CAF), commanders, security officials, NCCs, and IAOs, and they 
use security information files, investigation reports, and mental health evaluations. In 
addition, all users are required to report any of these types of behavior that they 
personally witness.   
  Some suspicious behaviors identified in insider threat research were not discussed 
in the policies, to include employees acting out of character or making alarming 
statements (Puleo, 2006).  Additionally, AFI 31-501 states that poor duty performance or 
a one-time incident related to alcohol or poor judgment should not  warrant the creation of 
an SIF, which is used when determining if employees should retain their security 
clearance (Department of the Air Force, 2005b).  This is not consistent with the guidance 
from the CMU CERT technical staff.    
4.3.10 Best Practice- “Deactivate computer access following termination” 
 
The USAF policies call for the disablement and deletion of user accounts of 
employees leaving the organization.  The NOSCs, NCCs, system administrators, and 
CSAs work together to make this happen.  AFMAN 33-223 states, “Ensure procedures 
are in place so the Network Control Center, workgroup manager, and system 
administrator are notified when an employee (military, civilian, or contractor) transfers, 
retires, separates, or is terminated” (Department of the Air Force, 2005c).  The language 
of this is a bit weak as it does not explicitly assign the responsibility of notifying these 
entities.  In DoDI 8500.2 the responsibility of notifying IA personnel when access to an 
information system is no longer needed is assigned to “authorized users” (Department of 
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Defense, 2003).  If the responsibility is solely in the hands  of the employees, they may 
not follow this in order to keep their accounts.  
4.3.11 Best Practice- “Implement secure backup and recovery processes” 
 
Per the policies, AFNOSC, NOSCs, and NCCs all must have backup, continuity 
of operation, and recovery plans in place.  Add itionally, AFNOSC is required to assist 
NOSCs and NCCs with their plans.  The policies mandate network personnel to backup 
servers daily and test recovery procedures quarterly.   What these plans should include is 
not spe lt out in the po licies.  For example, there is no discussion of whether redundant 
servers should be in place or whether ghost images should be maintained.   
4.3.12 Best Practice- “Analyze current access control policies and practices; 
identify and evaluate options to mitigate insider threat risk” 
 
  The DoD and USAF policies discuss the major topics surrounding access control, 
to include identification and authentication.  Access is further contingent on security 
clearances and need-to-know for the mission at hand.  Additional restrictions for special 
users, such as foreign nationals, contractors, and volunteers, are identified as well.  
Particular attention is paid to privileged users, classified or controlled information, 
SIPRNET systems, remote access, shared files, firewalls, and intrusion prevention 
systems.  The USAF Information Warfare Center and NCCs are required to report all 
backdoors and unauthorized connections to the NOSCs.  Other topics covered are 
building and area entry controls, granting o f interim access, and deletion of access.  
  AFNOSC, unit commanders, ISSOs, and IAOs also play roles in granting and 
controlling access to information and information systems.  They use such tools as user 
licensing, position requirements and qualifications, IA awareness and training, network 
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components us ing media access control, Access Control Lists (ACL), and system security 
author ization agreements. 
  Many successful insider attacks have included the creation of dummy accounts 
and back doors; therefore, access control is of utmost importance (Cappelli et al., 2006).  
While the reviewed policies do d iscuss managing ACLs, the only specific regulations are 
for CND systems, such as firewalls and intrusion prevention systems, and service 
de livery po int routers.  Also, as mentioned previously, the procedures for notifying the 
network personnel that an employee’s access should be removed are fairly vague and 
leave the responsibility to “authorized users.”   
4.3.13 Best Practice- “Clearly document insider threat controls” 
 While these results show that the DoD and USAF have controls in place to 
mitigate insider threat, they are rarely stated as such.  The only explicit references are in 
regards to training employees on insider threat and reporting suspicious behavior related 
to espionage or sabotage.   
4.3.14 Variable- “Sanctions” (for inappropriate technical acts) 
 In terms of issuing sanctions, the po licies focus on the suspension or  loss of a 
security clearance and restricted access to controlled areas or information.  The CAF, 
DAA, commanders, and CSAs are all invo lved and primarily use information within the 
SIF and regarding violations of the licensing principles to make their decisions.  These 
principles are spelt out in AFI 33-115, Volume 2 and include “failure to maintain an 
acceptable level of proficiency on a critical program; actions that threaten the security of 
a network or a governmental communications system; [and] actions that may result in 
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damage or harm to a network or governmental communications system” (Department of 
the Air Force, 2004a).   
  As discussed earlier, sanctions can have varying effects.  While for some 
employees it increases their risk adversity and therefore decreases their motivation to 
cause further incidents, for others it increases both their disgruntlement and motivation to 
cause an attack.  The CMU CERT technical staff recommends using employee 
intervention to help reduce the disgruntlement (Cappe lli et al., 2007).  This organizational 
control is not discussed in the DoD and USAF policies. 
4.3.15 Variable- “Organization's Prioritization of Profit”  
 Given that the USAF is a government agency, it is not in the business of 
generating profits, which would naturally lead to the conclusion that it would be willing 
to invest significantly in security controls.  One caveat is that the USAF’s funding is 
approved by Congress and therefore it does not have complete control over how its 
budget is spent. 
4.3.16 Variable- “Organization's Prioritization of Reputation” 
 Given that the USAF is in the business of national secur ity, it is inherently 
concerned with its reputation, in the eyes of the citizens of the United States, of its allied 
nations, and of its adversarial nations.  It would make sense to conclude that the USAF 
would want to invest extensively in security controls.  Similar to the section above, the 
USAF is limited by its Congressional budget. 
4.3.17 Variable- “Organization's Trust of Insider” 
  The DoD and USAF policies discuss the fact that complete confidence cannot be 
achieved, so a risk management approach is used to determine access to critical 
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information and systems.  The “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for 
Access to Classified Information” are important tools for those in charge of granting 
access.  There guidelines cover all three of the aspects of trust outlined in this research, 
ability, integrity, and benevolence.  In terms of ability, the guidelines look at the 
individuals’ psychological conditions, possible addictions, and any past incidents where 
they proved their failure to protect controlled information or correctly use information 
systems.  The guidelines relevant to benevolence are concerned about employees’ 
allegiance to the United States, as well as their foreign influence, preference, or activities.  
In terms of integr ity, the guidelines look at the individuals’ criminal record, financial 
activity, and history of use and handling of information and information systems. 
4.3.18 Variable- “Insider Stress” 
 The stress level of insiders can play into their disgruntlement and desire to 
satisfy their personal needs, perhaps at the detriment of their organization (Band et al.,  
2006).  Supervisors and co-workers should look for displays of stress and intervene to 
prevent the problem from escalating.  The DoD and USAF policies do not discuss this 
aspect of the insider threat problem. 
4.3.19 Variable- “Stressful Event” 
 The occurrence of a stressful event historically has been a trigger for malicious 
insider attacks (Band et al., 2006).  Similar to the section above, supervisors should be 
monitoring for  such events, whether they are events that affect the entire organization 
(like  a reduction- in-force) or  just one employee (like a divorce).   The DoD and USAF 
policies do not discuss this aspect of the insider threat problem. 
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4.3.20 Variable- “Personal Predispositions” 
  By conducting background investigations, the DoD and USAF examine an 
employee’s predispositions quite thoroughly, covering areas such as criminal activity, 
mental health, allegiance to the United States, addictions, sexual behavior, inappropriate 
handling of information and information systems, and financial responsibility.  The 
investigation also entails obtaining a historical picture of the individual’s personal 
conduct, by talking with employers, co-workers, and family and friends.  Areas of 
interest are disloyalty, dishonesty, unreliability, untrustworthiness, lack of sound 
judgment, irresponsibility, lack of candor, disruptive or violent behavior, and 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations. 
  One aspect that is not covered in the policies is trying to obtain insight into an 
individual’s personality, to inc lude whether the person is malicious, egotistical, resistant 
to change, and lacking in social skills. 
4.3.21 Variable- “Negative Relationships with Co-Workers” 
  The po licies focus on relationships an employee has with individuals who have 
exhibited a weak allegiance to the United States and committed espionage, treason, 
terrorism, or sedition.  Per the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for 
Access to Classified Information,” background investigators also look for an employee’s 
association with persons who have a history of criminal activity or sabotage.   The 
policies do not discuss identifying an employee’s relationships with co-workers who have 
committed technical or behavioral precursory events at work. 
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4.3.22 Variable- “Positive Relationships with Co-Workers” 
 Though the DoD and USAF policies did discuss searching for unhealthy 
relationships, they do not mention researching those which an individual has with 
favorable co-workers.  While the USAF promotes teamwork, the frequency of relocation 
for active duty employees could affect how socially tied to the organization they are. 
4.3.23 Variable- “Personal Needs” 
  In terms of personal needs the policies cover those related to finances and foreign 
influences.  Per the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to 
Classified Information,” background investigators look for evidence of unexplained 
affluence, embezzlement, frivolous spending, gambling problems, or inability to live 
within one’s means or repay debts.  The investigators also search for “substantial 
business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country” (Under Secretary for 
Management, 2006).  The policies do not discuss gaining insight into the individuals’ 
need for revenge, for recognition, to prove their talents, or to boost their self-confidence.  
Additionally, the policies do not instruct investigators to uncover evidence of a sadistic 
nature. 
4.3.24 Variable- “Detecting Concerning Behavior and Technical Actions” 
 
As mentioned earlier, there are policies in place to monitor suspicious behavior in 
the workplace in terms of technical incidents, to include actions threatening network 
security, requests for unauthorized access to controlled information, and unauthorized 
technology transfers.  In accordance with the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining 
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information,” background investigators also look for 
past incidents of mishandling protected information or information systems.  Examples of 
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concerning behavior include the following: copying or disclosure of controlled 
information, storing controlled information in an unauthor ized location, noncompliance 
with procedures or regulations, unauthorized modification or destruction of information 
systems, and unauthorized introduction of hardware or software. 
  As mentioned previously, the policies do not include guidance and requirements 
for detecting behavior precursors such as decrease in job performance or making 
alarming s tatements.   
 
4.4 Recommendations for Better Mitigating Insider Threat 
This next section presents recommendations for nine areas which were identified 
in this research as needing additional measures in order to better protect the USAF from 
insider attacks. 
4.4.1 Risk Management and Backup Plans 
  While risk management is covered significantly in the DoD and USAF policies, 
the focus is on identifying threats and vulnerabilities.  Additionally, the USAF must 
determine the risk of a threat-source exercising or triggering a vulnerability.  The risk is 
comprised of both the likelihood and impact of this occurring.  Organizations must also 
assess the ability of current controls to mitigate this risk.  Determining the risk is 
important as it guides investments in security controls and the creation of security 
policies (Stoneburner et al., 2002).  Organizations often prioritize high-risk assets as they 
are more likely to be compromised or the impact would be significant if they were. 
  The prioritization of assets is an important element in creating sound backup and 
recovery plans as well.  To achieve continuity of ope rations in the event of an attack, 
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redundancy should be built into the network, especially for high-risk assets.  If the attack 
completely destroys resources, those that are high- impact are often those that an 
organization wants to replace and put back on line first.  The DoD and USAF policies 
briefly discuss the need for backup and recovery plans, but it is advisable for greater 
emphasis and detail to be provided, to include the incorporation of risk management. 
  A key element to the success of an enterprise risk assessment is the invo lvement 
of leadership, not simply network professionals.  The leaders are best qualified to assess 
factors such as impact to mission.  The leaders also need to be in charge of determining 
and balancing the organizational priorities.  Though the USAF is not a profit-oriented 
business, it does have to be a responsible steward of it Congressional budget.  Since the 
USAF is highly concerned about its reputation, the prioritization of investments is even 
more challenging; the USAF must aim for strong security on a tight budget.   
4.4.2 Limit Power of a Single Employee 
Historically, many successful attacks have resulted from one individual, such as a 
system administrator, possessing too much power on the network.  It is vital to have 
checks and ba lances with the organization to p revent this.  One such method is to require 
two-person compliance for privileged activities.  While the DoD and USAF policies 
require this for a select few activities, it is advisable to require it for more.  One such 
activity that would be a prime candidate for two-person compliance is the production of 
data back-ups.  An organization can have sound recovery plans, but if a malicious 
network professional is purposefully not creating, destroying, or stealing the back-ups, 
the plans will be of little use.   The fact that Timothy Lloyd stole the back-up tapes from 
the Omega Engineering Corporation greatly increased the damages to the company 
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(Melara et al., 2003).  Another activity for which it is advisable to have two-person 
compliance is the creation of new user accounts.  Many successful insider attacks have 
included insiders creating bogus accounts in order to commit the malicious acts 
(Cappe lli et al., 2006).   
As mentioned earlier, these policies of separation of duties and least privilege 
should be applied to more than just activities related to information systems.  An 
organization’s security can benefit from these being embraced for managerial, 
administrative, and personnel functions as well.  
4.4.3 Account Management 
  As mentioned in the previous section, account management is a vital aspect of the 
mitigation of insider threat.  In addition to closely monitoring the creation of new 
accounts, network professionals should frequently check for bogus accounts.  This should 
be done randomly; if it is done on a certain day every month, a malicious user could 
delete the phony account before it would be detected (Cappelli et al., 2006).  ACLs 
should be monitored consistently and randomly as well.  Finally, while the policies 
require special attention for SA and other privileged accounts, the specifics of this should 
be outlined, to include the frequency of and what is included in checks.  Examples of 
activities that should be monitored are as follows: creating user accounts, modifying 
systems or policies, running scripts, and modifying logs (Cappe lli et al., 2006). 
  The accurate deletion of accounts, privileges, and access is also essent ial in 
mitigating insider attacks.  The DoD and USAF policies mention that procedures should 
be in place to ensure deletion occurs, and most likely the specific measures are spelt out 
at a lower level of documentation.  In terms of these measures, it is recommended that the 
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user whose access is being deleted is not the one responsible for notifying the network 
professionals.  It would be better to have the supervisor notify the appropriate network 
personnel.  The extended use of the CACs should be helpful as well, as long as 
procedures are in place for the revocation of them upon termination.  
  Since malicious insiders have been found to be more comfortable executing 
inappropriate behavior from remote accounts, such accounts need to be highly monitored 
(Cappelli et al., 2006).  The policies should explicitly state who grants permission for  
remote access, such as a unit commander.  Additionally, while the policies discourage the 
ability for remote users to execute privileged actions, a more strict and explicit policy 
may be more effective.  It would be best to clearly spell out which functions are of 
special concern and who would decide whether these could be executed remotely.    
4.4.4 Monitoring Online Actions 
 While the policies clearly require the collection and auditing of activity logs, there 
should also be specifics regarding for which activities to look, how often logs are 
reviewed, and how long they should be maintained.  Additionally storage space and 
bandwidth are serious concern for the USAF.  Logs can obviously not be kept  
indefinitely, and the amount of data collected can overwhelm some networks, especially 
those which are deployed.  Research should continue in the area of automated auditing 
tools, such as the work being done by MITRE (Lee, 2007). 
4.4.5 Creating Baselines 
Per the reviewed policies, the USAF primarily identifies malicious code through 
the use of signature-based tools which look for known dangerous code.  The USAF could 
benefit from using anomaly-based tools which look for changes to vital files.  Many 
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attacks target such files as “Windows Explorer” and “Task Manager” to cause damage 
and hide their own presence and activity (Grimaila, 2008).  If the USAF was to create and 
maintain baselines of these files and routinely compare them to the files’ current state, 
then alterations could be detected.   
The USAF could also create baselines of typical user behavior on the network.  If 
users began to act abnormally, such as look ing at files they do not usua lly access or  
working odd hours, this could trigger the network professionals to look  more closely at 
these users’ activities.   Unfortunately, creating and maintaining baselines for all network 
users would be quite time-consuming and expensive.  Given the USAF’s current budget, 
it might be wise to focus on privileged users such as system administrators.   While 
anomaly-based tools can detect unusual network activity and attacks that do not have 
signatures, they can also trigger many false positives (Grimaila, 2008).  This could lead 
to network security professionals wasting their time investigating innocuous activity and 
morale decreasing if employees feel the USAF has little trust in them and is suspicious of 
anything they do out of the ordinary. 
4.4.6 Training and Awareness  
Training and awareness regarding insider threat is one of the most important 
tactics the USAF could adopt.  All employees should understand the significance of the 
threat and what the possible damages are.  They should understand what variables and 
specific behaviors are common among malicious insiders so that they may be better 
prepared to identify and report them.  In the cases of both Robert Hanssen and Timothy 
Lloyd, there were many behavioral warning signs, but co-workers were either uneducated 
or reporting procedures were not in place.  All USAF employees must understand that 
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they all play a role in the mitigation of insider threat; deterrence and detection is 
dependent on everyone working together. Often a co-worker dismisses suspicious 
behavior of a fellow employee because it is a one-time occurrence, and s/he does not 
want to get the individual into trouble.  What the co-worker may not know is that 
suspicious behavior has also been witnessed by others.  The conglomeration of all the 
incidents is what could signal to an organization that it needs to intervene before an 
attack occurs.   
While the DoD and USAF policies include many insider threat countermeasures, 
the typical network user may not be aware of them.  Given the amount of information 
available today, it would not be surprising if employees do not read every security policy.  
Similar to the discussion of auditing log files, some work-related activities are very time-
consuming, and subsequently there may not be time for all of them to be accomplished.   
Insider threat training and awareness should ensure that employees are indeed educated 
about them (Cappelli et al., 2006).  The success of some of these controls relies on the 
employees’ correct implementation of them.  For example, the USAF requires CACs for 
logging onto most information systems.  If users are sharing their pins or not locking their 
work s tations when they are away from their desks, this secur ity measure is not effective.  
While hopefully most employees know not to give their passwords or access to their 
accounts to outsiders, they must understand the importance of maintaining the same 
diligence with their co-workers as well.  Additionally, potential malicious parties may be 
less inclined to try to forge an attack if they are aware of all the security measures in 
place, such as monitoring o f online activity (Cappe lli et al., 2006).   
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Training programs should also focus on the tactics that malicious insiders may use 
against their co-workers.  When being made aware of social engineering, USAF 
employees should be instructed that many malicious insiders use this method to gain 
necessary information for their attack.  Employees cannot only monitor the behavior of 
those outside the organization; they must be wary of co-workers who are asking for 
information they do not need or are not authorized to access.   
  Currently the USAF conducts the majority of its IA training via computer-based 
training during which an individual user reads text and then answers questions.  To 
improve the benefit and enjoyment of training, it is recommended that the USAF look 
into more interactive training methods.  These could include scenario-based online games 
or discussion-based workshops.  The CMU CERT technical staff has developed case 
studies for organization to use in training situations which can help employees practice 
what they are being taught (Moore et al., 2008).  Currently, due their sensitive nature red 
team outbriefs are only presented to top leadership.  It is recommended that as much 
information as possible is also given to the general populace so that they can learn from 
their own mistakes.    
4.4.7 Gaining Insight into Personality of the Insider 
  While the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to 
Classified Information” look into an individual’s past behaviors, it would also be wise for 
the investigators to develop a personality profile on the person by talking with their 
family, friends, co-workers, and supervisors.  Characteristics of interest would include 
the following: resistance to change (Cappelli et al., 2007), maliciousness, egotism, 
sadism, dishonesty, risk-taking, instability, and lack of strength of character, self-control, 
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or social skills (Tuglular, 2000). The investigators should also look into past instances 
where the individuals exhibited a strong and unhealthy need for revenge, for recognition, 
to prove their talents, or to boost their self-confidence (Casey, 2004).  Supervisor and co-
workers can also help to gaining this insight as they work most closely with the 
individual. 
4.4.8 Role of the Supervisor  
  A mitigation strategy that the USAF should emphasize and state in policy is the 
development of a strong working relationship between supervisors and their supervisees.  
Professionally, supervisors should understand what goals and expectations the ir 
supervisees have; as mentioned earlier unmet expectations can lead to disgruntlement 
(Cappe lli et al., 2007).  This could be accomplished during the routine evaluations that 
the USAF currently requires.  Ideally, supervisees would feel comfortable expressing 
concerns with their supervisors instead of planning sabotage.  On the personal side, 
supervisors should check in with the ir supervisees to see if there are any stressful events 
going on in their lives.  Often stress from outside the workplace filters in and affect one’s 
job performance.  It is especially important for supervisors to talk with supervisees if they 
are acting out of character or if the supervisors have learned about the occurrence of 
stressful events.  Supervisors should also be on the lookout for any relationships the ir 
supervisees have with co-workers who could have a negative influence on them.  While 
intervention can be challenging, it is best to act early and hopefully prevent the problem 
from escalating.  If employees are not comfortable talking with supervisors, the 
supervisors can recommend other resources, such as mental health professionals or the 
chaplains.   
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  As stated earlier, one-time incidents related to alcohol or poor judgment are not 
included in SIFs.  This is concerning due to how frequently USAF personnel change jobs 
and supervisors.  An employee could habitually be involved in this type of behavior, but 
if each occurrence is detected by a new supervisor, then it is never recorded.  Information 
regarding poor duty performance is also not kept in SIFs.  Though this can be due to lack 
of ability or training, it can also be due to employees no longer caring about their jobs.  It 
can be the first sign that they are disgruntled and planning to harm the organization 
(Puleo, 2006).  These behaviors are important for supervisors to take notice of and 
monitor.   
  Supervisors, security clearance investigators, and network professionals all play a 
role in collecting information related to the insider threat problem, but the information is 
not always shared or fused.  In the absence of such a system or process, the supervisor 
can be an important integrator of detectable behaviors.  The supervisor can also assist in 
gaining insight into the insider’s personality as the supervisor interacts with the 
individual more than most others in the organization.  The supervisor is essentially the 
first line of defense in mitigating this problem.   
4.4.9 Documenting Insider Threat Controls 
  While the DoD and USAF policies discuss many controls which are in place to 
help mitigate the insider threat problem, there are very few explicit references to “insider 
threat,”  “espionage,” or “sabotage.”  To show its efforts in protecting against such 
attacks, the USAF may want to indicate these clearly in more of its policies.  The USAF 
could also publish a separate policy or publication centered on insider threat as it does for 
counterintelligence (Department of the Air Force , 2000). 
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4.5 Additional Best Practices for All Organizations 
 In addition to the recommendations specifically for the USAF, this research 
purposes three new best practices that supplement those published by the CMU CERT 
technical staff and similarly can be adopted by any organization.  These were developed 
after comparing the current best practices to published variables and models, historical 
case studies, the DoD and AF policies that were reviewed, and the models developed for 
this research, especially the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage.  
4.5.1 Screen for prior concerning behavior and technical actions, as well as 
personal dispositions 
  The best practices published by the CMU CERT technical staff address 
monitoring for both concerning behavior and technical actions, but only once the insider 
is a part of the organization.  There is no discussion about trying to identify prior 
inappropriate behaviors or incidents.  There is also no recommendation for gaining 
insight into the insider’s personality (such as maliciousness, egotism, and resistance to 
change) and needs (e.g., for revenge, for recognition, to prove their talents, or to boost 
their self-confidence) (Tuglular, 2000; Casey, 2004).  While this may be difficult to 
accomplish, it is advisable to attempt to do so during the interview or background 
investigation process.  
United States government agencies, to include the military, use the “Adjudicative 
Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information” during their 
background investigations.  These guidelines require the investigation to cover such areas 
as past criminal activity, allegiance to the United States, addictions, sexual behavior, 
financial responsibility, and inappropriate handling of information and information 
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systems.  The investigator also acquires a picture of the individual’s past personal 
conduct, to include incidents related to disloyalty, dishonesty, unreliability, 
untrustworthiness, lack of sound judgment, irresponsibility, lack of candor, disruptive or 
violent behavior, and unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations. 
This best practice relates to the following variables in the Insider Threat Model 
for Sabotage and Espionage: Personal Dispositions, Personal Needs, and Detecting 
Concerning Behavior and Technical Actions.  These are highlights in green in the Insider 
Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage, repeated in Figure 24 for convenience. 
4.5.2 Issue sanctions to employees for inappropriate technical acts 
The best practices published by the CMU CERT technical staff recommend 
issuing sanctions for inappropriate employee behavior.  While the best practices discuss 
informing employees of the repe rcussions of violating security measures, they do not 
address the issuing of sanctions for such violations.  Responding to inappropriate or 
unauthorized technical acts is an important measure in preventing additional and possibly 
worse incidents from occurring.  If malicious insiders are detected and disciplined, they 
may become less motivated to attack a second time as their risk adversity is increased 
(Band et al., 2006).  Even if the act is fairly innocuous or appears accidental, employee 
intervention should occur.  The seemingly benign incident could be caused by a 
malicious insider who is testing the strength of the security controls (Stanton et al., 2005).  
Additionally, even an accidental incident can cause damage.  Documentation should 
supplement the sanctions to aid the detection of a pattern, should it develop.  Users of an 
organization’s network should be held accountable for acts they commit that degrade its 
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 Figure 24. Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage 
 
security and safety.  It is important to note that disgruntled insiders may become even 
more upset if issued sanctions.  Intervention, perhaps by the supervisor, may be beneficial 
to supplement the discipline.  
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The USAF does discipline its employees for acts that harm or risk the security of 
the network and information systems.  Sanctions include restricted access to controlled 
areas and information and suspension or loss of a security clearance.   
This best practice relates to several of the variables in the Insider Threat Model 
for Sabotage and Espionage, to include Sanctions, Sanctioning Relative to Insider 
Actions, Insider’s Perceived Risk, Behavioral & Technical Indicators or Violations 
(Actual), Insider Stress (in terms of disgruntlement), and Personal Needs (in terms of 
motivation).  These are highlights in magenta in the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage 
and Espionage (Figure 24). 
4.5.3 Require supervisors to take a proactive role 
Though the CMU CERT technical staff’s best practices addresses training 
supervisors to detect and respond to concerning behavior, the vital role of the supervisor 
as an integrator is not captured.  In addition to monitoring for suspicious behavior, the 
supervisor should look for signs of stress, especially if the supervisor is aware of the 
occurrence of stressful events.  Supervisors work closely with their supervisees and may 
be able to gain insight into their personalities, predispositions, needs, and relationships 
within the organization.  The supervisor can also work to keep the insider’s expectations 
at a realistic level and hopefully alleviate disgrunt lement (Cappelli et al., 2007).  The 
supervisor should have access to personnel records; of particular interest is any pattern of 
concerning behavior.  Additionally, the supervisor needs to properly issue sanctions for  
inappropriate or unauthorized behavior and document these in the insider’s records.  The 
supervisor is the first line of defense and plays a significant role in mitigating insider 
threat. 
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The USAF policies discuss the storing of unfavorable information in an 
employee’s SIF.  Incidents related to theft, family abuse, unauthorized use of weapons, 
and embezzlement are examples of what can be included in this repository.  The SIF is a 
tool used to determine an employee’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
This best practice relates to several of the variables in the Insider Threat Model 
for Sabotage and Espionage, to include Personal Dispositions, Positive Relationships 
with Co-Workers, Negative Relationships with Co-Workers, Personal Needs, Discovering 
Harmful Actions, Detecting Concerning Behavior and Technical Actions, Sanctions, 
Sanctioning Relative to Insider Actions, Stressful Events, and Insider Stress.  These are 
highlights in yellow in the Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and Espionage (Figure 24). 
 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter explained the methodology of the content analysis conducted on the 
DoD and USAF policies, to include a description of the CMU CERT’s best practices.  
This chapter also discussed the results of the review; key actors, tools, and areas of focus 
were identified in addition to shortfalls and conflicts.  Recommenda tions were presented 
that the USAF could implement in order to better prevent, detect, and respond to 
malicious insider attacks.  Lastly, the chapter discussed three new best practices aimed at 
helping all organizations with this complex problem.   
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V. Conclusions 
 
 
5.1 Summary of the Problem 
 
This research showed how significant the insider threat problem currently is for 
all organizations.   In addition, the difficulty of the problem was explained, to include a 
discussion of the fact that there is no definitive profile for malicious insiders, 
organizations have placed trust in these ind ividuals, and ins ide rs have a vast advantage of 
knowing their organization’s personnel, security policies, and information systems.    
This research covered many aspects of the insider threat problem, to include 
common psychological, professional, legal, and economic characteristics and behaviors 
of malicious insiders, as well as technical precursors which have been documented in 
historic attacks.  The roles played by an insider’s expectations, insider’s motivations, 
event triggers, and social networks were analyzed as well.  In addition, factors attributed 
to the organization, such as controls, priorities, and trust, were discussed.   
In order to review the USAF policies against the most appropriate model, this 
research conducted insider threat modeling.   Initially a logical data model and a system 
dynamics model were developed based on previous models from Tuglular (2000) and the 
CMU CERT technical staff.  Once that was accomplished, the Abstracted Common 
Model was chosen as the basis of this research’s Insider Threat Model for Sabotage and 
Espionage, due largely to its abs tractness and inclus ion of bo th espionage and sabotage.  
There was also an explanation of the incorporation of motivations, organizational 
priorities, and social networks into this research’s final model.  These three variables all 
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play significant roles in the insider threat problem and were shown to be relevant to the 
USAF. 
The DoD and USAF polices were reviewed in terms of how well they addresses 
both the variables of the Inside r Threat Mode l for Sabotage and Espionage  and the best 
practices published by the CMU CERT technical staff.  The results of the policy review 
were presented, focusing on shortfalls and conflicts.  This research offered actionable 
recommendations that the USAF can implement in order to better prevent, detect, and 
respond to malicious insider attacks.  The most significant area for improvement is the 
utilization of its workforce.  All personnel should be trained on observable behaviors that 
can be precursors to malicious activity.  Additionally, supervisors need to be empowered 
as the first line of defense, monitoring for stress, unmet expectations, and disgruntlement.  
In addition, this research proposed the following best practices that can be used by any 
organization to mitigate this threat to security: screening for prior concerning behaviors, 
predispositions, and technical incidents, issuing sanctions for inappropriate technical acts, 
and requiring supervisors to take a proactive role.   
 
5.2 Thesis Conclusions 
Mitigating the threat from malicious insiders necessitates a solution that involves 
people, processes, and technology.  The USAF is indeed utilizing technology to protect 
itself against insider attacks.  The policies outline the use of such tools as intrusion 
detection systems, network activity monitoring devices, virus signatures, and strong 
encryption.  One recommendation in this area is to utilize hash functions to compare the 
baseline and current state of files to detect alterations. 
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The USAF also has many strict policies in place to mitigate this problem, 
covering such as topics as strong passwords, least privilege, extra caution with privileged 
users, backup plans, and access control.  The USAF also conducts extensive background 
checks on its employees, following the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining 
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information.”  This research did have several 
recommendations in this area, to include more detailed procedures regarding account 
deactivation, remote access, and privileged users and actions.  Additionally, the USAF 
needs to limit the power of a single individual; this can be done by increasing the 
separation of duties and not  just for technical procedures.  Frequent and random checks  
for bogus accounts (“back doors”) should be conducted as well.  Additional guidance for  
auditing could help to improve this area of weakness, to include for which activities to 
look, how often logs are reviewed, and how long logs should be maintained.  Lastly the 
steps of evaluating controls and determining likelihood and impact need to be included in 
the risk management process.  It is also important that leadership is involve in this 
assessment as the leaders have greater insight into mission impact than those working 
solely on network ope rations. 
The USAF’s largest area in which it could improve is in utilizing its workforce to 
help fight against this problem.  First of all, all employees should receive training and 
awareness regarding insider threat.  Areas of focus should include tactics that may be 
directed at them, such as social engineering, and suspicious behavior which they can help 
detect and report.  It is also important that all employees are aware of their organization’s 
security policies.  This understanding enhances the likelihood of the policies being 
followed and therefore improves their effectiveness.  The knowledge may also deter 
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potential malicious insiders if they understand all the controls in place, such as 
monitoring and sanctions.  Training could include discussion-based workshops during 
which co-workers run through scenarios to practice identifying the observable behaviors 
and actions.  Supervisors additionally need to develop relationships with their supervisees 
in order to help reduce unmet expectations, disgruntlement, and stress.  It is also 
important for supervisors to document concerning behaviors and events, as well as ensure 
sanctions are issued (e.g., employee intervention or restriction of access).  Lastly, 
supe rvisors and co-workers can bo th help the organizations in gaining insight into the 
other insiders’ personalities and needs as they work most closely with them. 
 
5.3 Impact of this Research 
Given how significant the insider problem is and how damaging a successful 
attack could be, the shortfalls identified in this research should be of concern to the 
USAF.  By suggesting solutions, this research hopes to assist the USAF in improving its 
stance against malicious insiders.  The new recommended best practices can aid all 
organizations in mitigating this threat. 
 
5.4 Possibilities for Future Research 
While this research examined 19 DoD and USAF documents from the 
communications, IA, personnel security, and special investigations arenas, this review 
was certainly not exhaustive.  Additionally,  there will certainly be new policies and 
directives that will be published in the future that could be examined in terms of how they 
help to mitigate this problem.  Additionally, during the September 2008 interview 
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(Cappe lli and Moore, 2008), the CMU CERT technical staff members said they were 
working on an upda ted version of the “Common Sense Guide  to Prevention and 
Detection of Insider Threats” (Cappe lli et al., 2006).  Once this is released, there will 
mostly likely be new best practices that could be compared to the DoD and USAF 
policies. 
While this research chose to use the Insider Threat Mode l for Sabotage and 
Espionage for a content analysis, other tests or analyses could have been run.  For 
example, the model could be compared to a single case study, such as the Hanssen or 
Lloyd case, or a multitude of cases to see how well it captures the variables in real insider 
attacks.   
Since there is no definitive profile and many of the warning signs are in the form 
of humanly observable behaviors, organizations are still dependent on humans to prevent 
attacks.  As discussed in the conclus ions, the most important mitigating factors are 
human beings.  As mentioned in Chapter IV, supervisors are vital players in detecting 
these behaviors.  An area for further examination is the integration of insider threat 
mitigation strategies into the training given to new supervisors.  Currently, the training 
includes subject areas such as conduct, discipline, and performance management for 
which insider threat information could possibly be incorporated (Drake, 2009).  
Future research could also work to make progress in information systems having 
the ability to sense and analyze activities and behaviors, with the goal being to attempt to 
automate human reasoning.  Ideally, if these systems felt that a particular user was a 
threat, they could alert leadership within the organization and possibly execute an 
automated response, such as denying the user further access to information systems.  
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The six different motives (Casey, 2004) examined in this research are not 
exclusively related to the insider threat problem, or even solely to information security.  
These motives have been used to gain insight into criminal behavior in general.  
Similarly, there may be other criminology research and models which could shed light 
onto the insider threat problem. 
Lastly, the insider threat problem could be examined in terms of force protection 
concepts since it is inherently a security issue.  There could be fundamental security 
concepts that have not yet been applied to its mitigation. 
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Appendix A: Detailed Policy Review 
1. Institute periodic enterprise-wide risk assessments. 
• Actors
• 
- DoD CIO, DISN DAA, Heads of DoD components, AFCA, 
AFIWC, 92 IWAS, AFOSI, AFNOSC, NCC, wing and base host units, 
MAJCOM, NAF, and wing IA offices/programs/personnel, 
program/project managers, CND personnel, ISSO 
Areas of Focus
• 
- DoD enterprise-wide, DoD component- level systems, 
base-level, ports/protocol management, interconnected systems, enclaves, 
individual IS, software (including patches), hardware, directives/technical 
orders/specifications, configuration settings, architecture, system life-cycle 
documents, wireless, biometrics, CONOPS, training and awareness 
programs 
Too ls
•  
- DoD CIO Annual IA Report, DoD uniform risk criteria, 
adjudicative process, IAVAs/IAVBs, C&A process, AFOSI-provided 
information, AFCA and other independent audits/assessments (to include 
Scope EDGE and 92 IWAS red teams), self-assessments, documented 
threats/vulnerabilities, trend analysis, software tools, Vulnerability 
Assessment Tool, network vulnerability or penetration testing, scans, logs, 
IA secur ity incidents and patterns 
o Aspects of risk assessment from DoD CIO to NCC to individual 
systems 
What is covered? 
o Analysis of threats, vulnerabilities, controls, risk 
o Feedback/communication between levels 
o Hierarchical structure 
• 
o Likelihood determination 
What are the shortfalls? 
o Impact determination 
• What are the conflicts? 
• 
None 
o Determine likelihood and impact 
What are recommendations?  
o Prioritize critical assets 
 
2. Institute periodic security awareness training for all employees. 
• Actors- DoD CIO, SAF/XCI, Director of NSA, Heads of DoD 
components, HQ USAF/IL, HQ USAF/ILCO, HQ USAF/ILCX, AETC, 
United States Air Force Academy, AFPC, AFOSI, AFCA (AFCA/WFP), 
MAJCOM functional manager, MAJCOM & wing IA offices/programs, 
wing/base host commanders/SC/units, Air Force Field Operating Agencies 
and Direct Reporting Units, unit commanders, unit IA awareness 
managers, Functional Systems Administrator, workgroup managers, DAA, 
ISSM/O, certifier (in C&A process), users/network professionals (to 
include military, civilian, guard, reserve, government contractors, foreign 
national employees) 
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• 
o Current, engaging, and relevant to the target audience to enhance 
effectiveness; influence behavior;  focus must be on actions that 
empower the user; must understand critical reliance on IS & that 
they are a critical link in IA posture 
Areas of Focus 
o Unauthor ized or illegal use of computer hardware and software 
o Potential harm to national security due to the improper use of 
information systems 
o Consequences if policies and procedures are not followed  
o Communications, network, emission, computer security 
o Identification and authentication; password construction 
o Internet “do’s and don’ts”  
o Threats, vulnerabilities & countermeasures concerning tampering, 
disclosures, modification, destruction, denial of service, fraud, 
misappropriation, misuse, access by unauthorized persons, social 
engineering, malicious code  
o Safeguarding information processed, stored, or transmitted on all 
these systems  
o Availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation  
o Privacy rights & consent to monitoring  
o Security responsibilities  
 Responding to and reporting suspicious activities and 
conditions; h 
 Protecting information and IT they access;; copyright, 
ethics, and standards of conduct; malicious code; prevent 
self- inflicted damage 
o Insider threat specific  
 ‘Insider threats’ 
 Social engineering 
 Countermeasures to protect systems and information from 
sabotage & espionage 
 Examples of internal threats such as malicious or 
incompetent authorized users, users in the employ of 
terrorist groups or foreign countries, disgruntled employees 
or Service members, hackers, crackers, and self- inflicted 
intentional or unintentional damage 
 Threat posed by foreign intelligence, foreign government-
sponsored commercial enterprises, all pertinent terrorist 
threats, and international narcotics trafficking organizations 
• Too ls
o Air Force IA Home Page (
  
https://private.afca.af.mil/ip) 
o DoD CIO Annual IA Report 
o Training/Courses- Air Force Information Assurance Awareness 
Training” Computer-Based Training (CBT), resident courses, 
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distributive or blended training, SOJT, exercises, 
certification/recertification 
 Initial military training- basic military training, O fficer 
Training School, Air Force Reserve Officer Training 
Corps, and specialized training in Air Force Specialty Code 
(AFSC)-awarding courses 
 Air University courses- formal schools and professional 
military education courses 
 Civilian career programs 
o Counterintelligence Awareness Briefings  
o Awareness materials- briefings, pamphlets, flyers, posters, base 
bulletins, trifolds, screen savers, and videotapes 
o Increased depth for students’ who may become involved in 
planning, programming, managing, operating, or maintaining 
information systems 
o Assessments of training 
• 
o Try to grab everyone when I first begin working with military 
What is covered? 
o Annual refresher 
• 
o Unaware of website & AFOSI briefs 
What are the shortfalls? 
o Quality of training/method used- effectiveness of CBT 
o Often refer to “IA training”- few specific references to “insider 
threat” 
o Need to discuss behaviors so employee know what to look for and 
they can repo rt 
o Tie between SE and IT 
• 
o We say users are “critical link” but the importance of this issue is 
not stressed 
What are the conflicts? 
• 
o Enhanced training- discussion-based, video game, red team 
outbriefs shared with more people 
What are recommendations? 
o IT material stressed and importance of every user- reportable 
behaviors 
o Tie between SE and IT 
 
3. Enforce separation of duties and least privilege. 
• Actors
• 
- Heads of DoD components, AFNOSC, NOSC, wing IA offices, 
Top Secret Control Office, IAM, IAO, ISSM, ISSO, SA, authorized users,  
Areas of Focus- DoD enclaves; Top Secret material; Top Secret Control 
Account; TCNOs; privileged users and access, privileged programs (OS, 
system parameter and configuration files, and databases); privileged 
utilities (assemblers, debuggers, and maintenance utilities); security-
relevant programs/data files (security monitor, password files, and audit 
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files); web sites containing official information; intelligence, proprietary, 
and control information; software/hardware/firmware; joint and coalition 
partners, Voluntary Emeritus Corps 
• Too ls
• 
- None 
o Obvious focus on TS, classified, privileged access 
What is covered? 
o Does cover broad issues of need-to-know 
• 
o IA functions, TCNOs & Top Secret Control Account inventory 
were only specific activities with two-person compliance 
What are the shortfalls? 
o Only information system activities covered 
• What are the conflicts? 
• 
None 
o Would think more NOSC/NCC functions would be prime to 
implement two-person compliance 
What are recommendations? 
o Need to make sure one person cannot be secretly doing things on 
the network 
o Applied to functions other than info systems 
 
4. Implement strict password and account management policies and practices. 
• Actors
• 
- NOSC, Red and Blue Team personnel, NCC, SA, FSA, unit 
security manager, CSA,WGM, ISSO,  
Areas of Focus
o Assign/maintain/delete user IDs/passwords/privileges, 
suspended/transferred/terminated personnel, locking/unlocking 
accounts, resetting passwords, updating e-mail addresses, one-time 
password, password composition, dormant accounts, rapid retries 
-  
o Individual accountability, reusable generic/group usernames, non-
repudiation, shared use of da ta 
o Limit elevated privileges (service accounts, , loading new users, 
password management, modifying and patching system routines or 
files, examining memory locations, real-time monitoring of user 
activities, trusted profile (e.g., system administrator, security 
officer, root user, super user, backup operators) 
o Remote session, password cracking, compromised passwords, 
enclave, encryption, wireless, SNMP management 
• Too ls
• 
- favorable background investigation, Personnel Security 
Management Program, proper security clearance, two-factor 
authentication, hardware tokens, PKI, policies, automated procedures (i.e. 
via OS), password enforcement software, i-TRM password cracking tools, 
IA program/annual training, assessments 
o Two of the most important issues 
What is covered? 
 individual accountability 
 non-repudiation 
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o Strong identification/authentication 
o Monitoring accounts 
o Actively searching for weaknesses 
o Good they focus on privileged acct 
• What are the shortfalls?
o Humans- SE, laziness, writing down passwords, sharing  
passwords 
   
o No explicit check for creation of bogus accounts 
 Yes, solid policies for granting an account (clearance, 
background check, training), checking for dormant, and 
terminating personnel who are leaving but what about 
checks on the people doing this (CSA, SA)—should be 
another person comparing accounts with valid users 
 CMU- need to prevent backdoors 
• What are the conflicts? 
• 
None 
o Push for biometrics & increased use of PKI 
What are recommendations? 
o Training 
 current- composition, identification/authentication 
 need SE, diligence, not sharing 
o Account checks- should be done frequently but randomly (CMU 
quote)  
 
5. Log, monitor, and audit employee online actions.  Collect and save data for use in 
investigations. 
• Actors
• 
- ISSM, ISSO, SA, Heads of DoD components, DoD Component 
IA program, IAT Level II Personnel, CND-A, CND-AU, AFOSI 
Areas of Focus
o Weak configurations, security holes/deficiencies,  
-  
o Core network services and infrastructure devices, VPN tunnel, 
system services for authentication 
o Incidents, unusual/inappropriate activity 
 Changing the security profile (e.g., access controls, security 
level of the subject, user password) 
 Successful/unsuccessful log- in attempts, file system 
modifications, change in pr ivileges 
 Attempted/realized penetrations/intrusions, unauthorized 
transmissions, unauthorized attempts to bypass automated 
information systems security devices or functions, 
unauthorized requests for passwords, or unauthorized 
installation of modems or other devices into automated 
information systems (including telephone systems) whether 
classified or unclassified 
o Inform users via consent to monitoring, associating the user’s 
identity with all auditable actions 
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o Unencrypted (clear text) passwords, incorrectly entered passwords, 
or character strings; access to the audit trail file; info directly to the 
user 
• Too ls
• 
- audit/monitoring/error/host/network traffic/firewall/intrusion 
detection logs/files, intrusion detection tools, deployable CND audit 
toolkit, IS aborts/suspends unauthorized user activity 
o Checking individual system, network activity (log- in, 
modifications), firewall 
What is covered? 
o Includes special mention of VPN—good since insiders often use 
o Attributing each action to a individual 
o Suspicious activities- file modifications, pr ivilege/security 
changes, unauthor ized transmissions, bypasses 
• 
o Training/awareness- consent to monitoring  
What are the shortfalls? 
o Additional suspicious activity to look at 
 sudden change in activity (working earlier/later, 
printing/transmitting more files, accessing files they don’t 
need for work) 
 would require creating baselines  
o Lots of discussion of collect but nothing that I saw about saving 
(how long, format, etc) 
• 
o Do we have the time and manpower to do all this and even more 
with personnel and budget cuts? 
What are the conflicts? 
• 
o Training/awareness- want to tell them what is being looked at 
specifically  
What are recommendations? 
o Guidance on cataloging/storing logs and reports 
o Create baselines if monitoring more activities 
 
6. Use extra caution with system administrators and privileged users. 
• Actors
• 
- Heads of the DoD Components, Wing IA Office, IAM, 
commanders and or supervisors 
Areas of Focus
• 
- contractors, Automated Information Systems (increased 
monitoring), separation of functions, personal accounts with domain 
administrative privileges, passwords, i-TRM password cracking tools 
Too ls
• 
- favorable National Agency Check, local agency check, a nd credit 
check, written inquiries, investigations, DOD issued PKI certificates/ 
hardware tokens, preparatory & sustaining DoD IA training and 
certification requirements, Privileged Access Agreement,” 
o Background checks  
What is covered? 
o Separating personal and privileged accounts 
o Separation of functions 
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• 
o “Maintain visibility” is very passive 
What are the shortfalls? 
o “Extra monitoring” for AIS- vague 
• What are the conflicts? 
• 
None 
o Explicit policies for monitoring sys admin (checks and ba lances) 
What are recommendations? 
 User account creation, modifications, running scripts, 
recommended policy changes, modifying logs  
 
7. Actively defend against malicious code. 
• Actors
• 
- HQ AFCA/EVP, AFIWC, AFNOSC, NOSC, NCC, Information 
Protection Operations personnel, CND- IS, CND-A, program manager, 
DAA, ISSO, CSA, authorized users  
Areas of Focus
• 
- wireless, web sites, E-mail, rules/signatures, 
freeware/firmware/shareware/public domain software,  timeliness of 
changes, removable and fixed media 
Too ls
antivirus tools/signature files/software, software patches and security 
fixes, user awareness training, local policies, configuration management, 
virus scan, malicious logic reports 
- AFCERT/DoD CERT sites, CSAP Database System, 
• 
o Strength- signature-based 
What is covered? 
o Big focus on viruses 
o Help from abo ve 
o Looking at array of mediums (software, e-mail, websites) 
o Taking a lot of control out of the hands of normal user 
• 
o Weakness- statistical-based 
What are the shortfalls? 
o No baselines of configurations 
• 
o Baselines can be expensive to create and update 
What are the conflicts? 
o May need various types depending on user role 
• 
o Create hashes of baselines of both software and hardware 
conf igurations so you can detect a change  (such as hash functions 
of key files- windows explorer and task manager) 
What are recommendations? 
 
8. Use layered defense against remote attacks. 
• Actors
• 
- NOSC, NCC, ANG NCC, IAM, IAO  
Areas of Focus
• 
- back-door access, additional network interface (modem, 
wireless, etc.), privileged access, High Impact PII electronic records, 
disconnecting dormant session, encryption 
Too ls- VPN client software, access tables, audit logs, NIST-certified 
cryptography, proxy services, screened subnets, DMZ 
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• 
o Restrictions on privileged actions and sensitive info 
What is covered? 
o Maintaining logs (increased attention to privileged actions) 
o Call- forwarding 
• 
o Does not spell out who validates need for remote access 
What are the shortfalls? 
o Does not discuss termination of accts- hopefully the same as other 
accounts 
• What are the conflicts? 
• 
None 
o Explicitly spell out who grants permission to remote access 
What are recommendations? 
o Explicitly spell out policy on disabling with termination of role 
“discouraged” 
 
9. Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive behavior. 
• Actors
• 
- AFOSI, Central Adjudication Facility, commanders, security 
officials, NCC OIC, IAO, AF Government Charge Card program 
coordinators, authorized users,  
Areas of Focus
o Theft, embezzlement, bankruptcy petitions, indebtedness 
-  
o Unauthorized sale or use of firearms, explosives/dangerous 
weapons, alleged criminal activity 
o Child or spouse abuse, child advocacy reports 
o Misuse or improper disposition of government property or other 
unlawful activities, Government Charge Card abuses and misuses,  
o AFOSI reports of investigation; civil/police/security forces 
incident/complaint reports; administrative/disciplinary actions to 
include records of counseling, letters of reprimand, Article 15, 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), or courts-martial orde rs 
o Medical or mental health evaluations  
o Action that threatens the secur ity of, or  damages/harms network o r 
government communications systems, IA-related events and 
potential threats and vulnerabilities invo lving a DoD information 
system 
o Foreign intelligence or any terrorist organization may have 
targeted for possible intelligence exploitation, request for illegal or 
unauthorized access to classified or unclassified controlled 
information, contact with a known or suspected intelligence 
officer, contact with foreign d iplomatic establishment, suspected 
espionage, terrorism, spying, treason, unlawful intelligence 
activities, sedition, subversion 
o Sabotage, unauthorized technology transfer, contemplated/ 
attempted/effected the deliberate compromise or unauthorized 
release of classified or unclassified controlled information 
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• Too ls
• 
- security information file, information assurance policies, special 
investigation policies 
What is covered?
• 
 criminal activity, technical precursors, financial, 
problems in family,  
o Acting out of character, alarming s tatements 
What are the shortfalls? 
o Foreign travel- does discuss relationships with foreign people, 
especially intelligence personnel or terrorists 
• 
o Poor duty performance- sign that they no longer care, will harm 
organization 
What are the conflicts?  
o Following could be early signs or mean more when pieced 
together- disciplinary issues, one-time alcohol related incident, 
single isolated incident of poor judgment based on immaturity or 
extenuating circumstances 
• 
o Should definitely include poor job performance, especially if it was 
good and has worsened (to include tardiness, absences, not 
meeting deadlines, quality of work) 
What are recommendations? 
o Need to look at alcohol incidents and any other addictions 
(gambling)  
o Also include unusual behavior, signs of stress 
 
10. Deactivate computer access following termination. 
• Actors
• 
- NCC, NOSC, SA, WGM, CSA, FSA  
Areas of Focus
• 
- E-mail account, SNMP management, user accounts 
Too ls
• 
- procedures 
What is covered?
• 
 E-mail, SNMP, user accounts 
  “Ensure procedures are in place” is quite weak 
What are the shortfalls? 
 E-mail still available for 60 da ys—could send a virus—
would most likely be trusted 
• What are the conflicts? 
• 
None 
o Standard, s trict procedures to ensure deletion or all accounts and 
privileges 
What are recommendations? 
 Spell out checking SA, database, remote access, and other 
privileged accounts 
o Shorter (or no grace period) with e-mail 
 
11. Implement secure backup and recovery processes. 
• Actors- AFNOSC, NOSC, NCC, IA Officer, IAT Level III Personnel, IA 
Manager (IAM) Level I Personnel  
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• Areas of Focus
• 
- IA requirements/features/procedures, NCC managed 
servers, NOSC managed core services, enclaves 
Too ls
• 
- Continuity of Operations Plan, quarterly tests, monitoring by IA 
officers, assistance from AFNOSC 
o Good that there is help from above 
What is covered? 
o Daily backups for their systems  
o Procedures/plans/COOP 
o Quarterly tests 
• 
o Vague 
What are the shortfalls? 
 Redundancy?   
 Ghost images?  
• What are the conflicts? 
• 
None 
What are recommendations?
 
  More concrete plans—perhaps do not have 
those in public domain 
12. Analyze current access control policies and practices and identify and evaluate 
options to mitigate insider threat risk.   
• Actors
• 
- USAF/CVA, AFIWC/IO, AFNOSC, MAJCOM/CC or MAJCOM 
NOSCs, FSA, DAA, ISSO, unit commanders,  IAO, Foreign Disclosure 
Office, authorized users 
Areas of Focus
o  Individual Ready Reserve, vendo r maintenance personnel, 
contractors, foreign nationals, volunteers, summer-hire employee, 
privileged user with IA responsibilities 
- 
o Classified/controlled unclassified information/media/products, 
SIPRNET, remote access, shared files, stand-alone system, 
enclaves, AIS applications, outsourced IT-based processes, 
platform IT interconnections, specialized CND systems (e.g., 
firewalls and intrusion prevention systems) 
o Backdoors and unauthorized connections, building and area entry 
controls, interim access, deleting access 
• Too ls
• 
- level of the position, identification/authentication/authorization, 
mission needs, clearances, favorable trustworthiness investigation, 
supe rvision, user licensing, IT position category requirements and 
qualifications, IA awareness and training, need to know, sanitization, 
network components using MAC, Access Control Lists, classification 
level of the information, mission assurance category, secur ity domain, 
releasability/sensitivity of information, SSAA 
o Special users- foreign nationals, privileged users, volunteers, etc 
What is covered? 
o High-risk items- SIPRNET, classified, controlled, special systems 
o Policies- Identification/authentication, clearances, need-to-know, 
mission 
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• What are the shortfalls?
• 
  Only mention of checking ACLs  is to “manage” 
or “update” for CND & SDP routers  
What are the conflicts? 
• 
None 
o ACLs- should be reviewed randomly and often, looking for 
oversights and phony/backdoor accounts 
What are recommendations? 
 
13. Clearly Document Insider Threat Controls 
• Actors
• 
- No explicit but incorporated into the above controls 
Areas of Focus
• 
-  No explicit but incorporated into the above controls 
Too ls
• 
- No explicit but incorporated into the above controls 
o Limited training/awareness 
What is covered? 
o Limited reportable behavior 
• 
o Many listed above 
What are the shortfalls? 
• What are the conflicts? 
• 
See above 
o Above recommenda tions 
What are recommendations? 
o Perhaps its own section within instructions 
o Sanctions (for inappropriate technical acts) 
• Actors
• 
- CAF, commander, DAA, CSA 
Areas of Focus
• 
- access to classified information, SCI and SAP access, 
unescorted entry to restricted areas, security clearance, license 
suspension 
Too ls
• 
- SIF, determination if individual is threat to network, licensing 
principles (failure to maintain an acceptable level of proficiency on a 
critical program; actions that threaten the security of a network or a 
governmental communications system; actions that may result in 
damage or harm to a network or governmental communications 
system; or actions that constitute unauthorized use under the 
provisions of AFI 33-119, Air Force Messaging, or AFI 33-129, Web 
Management and Internet Use) 
o Suspension, loss of clearance, access to information/resources 
What is covered? 
o Looks at SIF, licensing principles 
• 
o Employee intervention 
What are the shortfalls? 
• 
• 
What are the conflicts? 
o Intervention to limit disgruntlement—need to get at root of 
problem 
What are recommendations? 
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• Organization's Prioritization of Profit  
• Actors
• 
- None 
Areas of Focus
• 
- None 
Too ls
• 
- None 
What is covered?
• 
 Not covered 
What are the shortfalls? 
• 
None 
o AF is not profit-oriented so should be willing to spend more on 
controls but we are restricted by federal budget 
What are the conflicts? 
• What are recommendations? 
 
None 
o Organization's Prioritization of Reputation 
• Actors
• 
- None 
Areas of Focus
• 
- None 
Too ls
• 
- None 
What is covered?
• 
 Not covered 
What are the shortfalls? 
• 
None 
o We should be highly concerned with reputation, again making 
us want to invest in controls (but have budget that restrains us) 
What are the conflicts? 
• What are recommendations?
 
 None 
o Organization's Trust of Insider 
• Actors
• 
- None 
Areas of Focus
• 
- complete confidence cannot be achieved, access 
decisions, secure environment, classified information 
Too ls
• 
- adjudicative guidelines, risk management 
o Risk management approach, critical assets that are of highest 
importance, background investigations 
What is covered?   
o All three categories covered 
• What are the shortfalls?
• 
 None 
What are the conflicts?
• 
 None 
What are recommendations?
 
 None 
o Insider Stress 
• Actors
• 
- None 
Areas of Focus
• 
- None 
Too ls
• 
- None 
What is covered?
• 
 Not covered 
o Role of supervisor and co-workers 
What are the shortfalls?  
• What are the conflicts? None 
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• 
o Supervisor and co-worker responsibility 
What are recommendations? 
o Would not see it in SIF, but intervention is important 
o Co-workers report to supervisor 
 
o Stressful Event 
• Actors
• 
- None 
Areas of Focus
• 
- None 
Too ls
• 
- None 
What is covered?
• 
 Not covered 
o Role of supervisor and co-workers 
What are the shortfalls? 
• What are the conflicts? 
• 
None 
o If supervisor knows of event should be more on the lookout for 
changes in behavior  
What are recommendations? 
o Co-workers should report to supervisor 
 
o Personal Predispositions 
• Actors
• 
- Surgeon General, Heads of the DoD Components, Mental 
Health Clinic  
Areas of Focus
o Sabotage, espionage 
-  
o Criminal conduct- serious offense, several minor , d ishonorable 
discharge, parole/probation,  
o Physical, mental, or emotional conditions 
o Allegiance to the United States- treason, terrorism, sedition, 
dual citizen and/or possess/use a foreign passport, 
employment/service to foreign organizations 
o Sexual behavior- criminal, poor judgment 
o Personal conduct- disloyalty, unreliability, untrustworthy, lack 
of sound judgment, irresponsibility, lack of candor, disruptive, 
violent, inappropriate behavior in the workplace, dishonesty or 
rule violations, dishonesty, unwillingness to comply with rules 
and regulations, breach of client confidentiality 
o Financial considerations- inability to live within one's means, 
satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations; unexplained 
affluence 
o Add ictions- drug abuse, alcoholism, gambling problems (and 
related incidents) 
• Too ls
• 
- SIF, Adjudicative Guidelines 
What is covered? criminal, mental, US allegiance, addictions, 
conduct/behavior, financial 
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• What are the shortfalls?
• 
 personality- malicious, egotistical, social 
skills, resistant to change 
What are the conflicts? 
• 
None 
o Personality profile- from past co-workers, supervisors, friends, 
family 
What are recommendations? 
 
o Positive Relationships with Co-Workers 
• Actors
• 
- None 
Areas of Focus
• 
- None 
Too ls
• 
- None 
What is covered?
• 
 Not covered 
What are the shortfalls? 
• 
supervisors’ role 
What are the conflicts? 
• 
None 
o Supervisors especially should be monitoring 
relationships/influences on their employees 
What are recommendations? 
 
o Negative Relationships with Co-Workers 
• Actors
• 
- Background clearance investigators 
Areas of Focus
o Allegiance to the United States- sympathy/association with 
people committing sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or 
sedition 
-  
o Association with persons involved in criminal activity 
• Too ls
• 
- Adjudicative Guidelines 
o Allegiance 
What is covered?  
o Criminal activity 
• 
o Association with co-workers committing precursory events at 
work (technical, behavioral) 
What are the shor tfalls? 
• What are the conflicts? 
• 
None 
o Supervisors especially should be monitoring 
relationships/influences on their employees 
What are recommendations? 
 
o Personal Needs 
• Actors
• 
- CAF 
Areas of Focus
o Financial considerations- inability to live within one's means, 
satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations; unexplained 
affluence, embezzlement, frivolous spending, gambling  
-  
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o Foreign influence  
1. Espionage, treason, terrorism, sedition 
2. Substantial business, financial, or property interest in a 
foreign country 
• Too ls
• 
- Adjudicative Guidelines 
o Foreign & financial influences 
What is covered? 
• 
o Need for revenge, recognition, prove themselves, boost one’s 
self-confidence, sadistic, achieve satisfaction 
What are the shortfalls? 
• 
• 
What are the conflicts? 
o Look for these personality characteristics- need for recognition, 
need to prove themselves, sadistic 
What are recommendations? 
o Look for development of disgruntlement 
 
o Detecting Concerning Behavior and Technical Actions 
• Actors
• 
- Background clearance investigators 
Areas of Focus
o Handling protected information- disclosure, copying, storing in 
unauthorized location, unapproved equipment, outside one's 
need to know, negligence or lax security habits 
- 
o Use of IT systems- noncompliance with rules, procedures, 
guidelines or regulations; illegal or unauthorized entry, 
modification, destruction, manipulation or denial of access; 
downloading, storing, or transmitting classified information on 
or to any unauthorized software, hardware, or information 
technology system; unauthorized use, introduction, removal, or 
duplication of hardware, firmware, software, or media to or 
from any information technology system without authorization; 
negligence or lax security habits 
• Too ls
• 
- Adjudicative Guidelines 
What is covered?
o This covers initial/historical technical information—rest if 
covered by monitoring & auditing 
  
• 
o Behavior- we need to be training our employees on what to 
look for so they can actually detect it 
What are the shortfalls? 
• What are the conflicts? 
• 
None 
o Training 
What are recommendations? 
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